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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENDALL Q. NORTHERN,
Petitioner,

t

Case No. 920116

t

Priority No. 13

v.
N. ELDON BARNES, et al.,
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(a) (1992), which grants the Utah Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the Court of
Appeals." Northern's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was granted
on October 28, 1992.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that the

Board did not violate the law, i.e., its own Rule 310, and that
therefore Petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary relief?
2.
cannot

Did the Court of Appeals correctly conclude that a court
judicially

discretionary

review

decision

to

the

Board

rescind

circumstances set forth in Rule 310?

1

of
a

Pardons'

parole

date

substantive
based

on

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In reviewing a denial of a habeas corpus petition, the court
examines the record

,f

in the light most favorable to the findings

and judgment . . . and will not reverse if there is a reasonable
basis in the record to support the trial court's denial of the
writ." Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons. 806 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1991
(citations omitted). A lower court's factual findings will be set
aside only if they are clearly erroneous.
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).

State v. Ramirez, 817

However, the lower court's "conclusions of

law are accorded no deference but are reviewed for correctness."
Termunde v. Cook, 786 P.2d 1341, 1342 (Utah 1990) (citing Fernandez
v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989)); see generally Stewart v. State,
830 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah App. 1992).
Likewise, in reviewing by writ of certiorari a decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals, this Court examines the legal conclusions of
the intermediate appellate court for correctness.

Landes v.

Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1992); Garrish v. Barnes,
202 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND OTHER RULES
The following provisions are included in Addendum A to this
brief.

Other relevant pleadings and documents, including the

judgment of the trial court and the opinion of the Utah Court of
Appeals are also included in the Addenda.
Utah Const, art. V, § 12 (1896, amended 1992)
Utah Const, art. V.
2

Utah Const, art. VIII, § 1 (1896, amended 1984).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (3) (Supp. 1992).
Utah Admin. Code R270-310 (Board of Pardons Policies and Procedures
Manual Number 3.10) (1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a review on certiorari of a decision of the Utah Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the order of the district court denying
Northern's petition for an extraordinary writ. Northern v. Barnes,
825 P.2d 696 (Utah App. 1992).
On July

(Addendum B ) .

30, 1980, petitioner was convicted

of criminal

homicide-murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, and
aggravated

robbery,

a

first

degree

felony.

Petitioner

was

sentenced to serve two five-to-life sentences at the Utah State
Prison (R. at 90). After a hearing before the Board of Pardons on
July 8, 1981, petitioner received a prospective parole date of May
10, 1988 (R. at 90). (Order of Parole, Addendum C).
Petitioner was transferred to the Duchesne County Jail in
March 1986 (R. at 91).

On February 25, 1988, jail authorities

discovered petitioner using marijuana (R. at 91). (Violation Report
of February 25, 1988, Addendum D).

The incident was reported to

officials at the Utah State Prison, and the Board of Pardons
obtained the information sometime prior to May 10, 1988 (R. at 91).
On March 24, 1988, the Utah Board of Pardons requested that
the Utah

State Prison perform

a psychological

assessment on

petitioner (R. at 91). The Board did not receive the results of
3

this psychological assessment until May 5, 1988, five days before
Northern's

proposed

Assessment

of May 5, 1988, Addendum

recommended

parole date

(R. at

E).

that the report be regarded

discussed Northern's drug problem
specifically,

the report

91).

(Psychological

While the authors
favorably, they also

in depth (R. at 92).

said that Northern viewed

More

his drug

dependency as a major factor in his anti-social behavior (R. at
92).

It also noted that Northern admitted being high on LSD at the

time he committed his crimes and that he had used LSD, cocaine,
amphetamines, and marijuana (R. at 91-92).

This information was

not available to the Board in 1981 (Finding of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal No. 10, Addendum F).
The

report

indicated

that

Northern's

major

problem

was

his

inability to deal with life's stresses without the use of illegal
substances (R. at 92).
In light of the information it had, the Board of Pardons had
concerns
Therefore,

regarding
on May

petitioner's
9,

1988, the

fitness
Board

for
of

parole
Pardons

release.
rescinded

Northern's parole release date of May 10, 1988 and continued the
matter pending a second psychological evaluation and complete
prison progress report (R. at 93).
The second psychological report was prepared on May 11, 1990.
It considered the issue of how Northern would react under stress in
an unstructured setting.

It considered how his relationship with

his father might affect his success as he was planning to live with
4

his parents, at least for a short time, while on parole (R. at 94).
The report recommended that petitioner be paroled to Arizona. (R.
at 94).

The report recommended that "due to his extensive drug

history and continued problem with drugs, drug therapy on an
outpatient basis should be required as well as therapy to assist
him in adjusting to the social demands of a new lifestyle."
On June 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a hearing for
July 8, 1988, to review petitioner's status (R. at 94). Petitioner
received notification of that hearing by June 28, 1988 (R. at 94).
At the July 8, 1988 hearing, petitioner was permitted to address
the

Board,

present

questions (R. at 94).

information,

and

respond

to

the

Board's

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board

of Pardons affirmed the rescission of petitioner's May 10, 1988
parole release date, stating:

"[T]he board is extremely concerned

about first of all, the risk that you present to society from the
overall record, from the nature of the crime, and specifically also
including the information which the board has received since that
time and in comparing it with the overall record."

R. at 94.

On October 9, 1988, Northern escaped from the Duchesne County
Jail (R. at 94). As a result, the Board of Pardons rescinded the
May 1990 scheduled rehearing (R. at 94-95).

He was subsequently

captured in Canada and returned to Utah on October 6, 1989 (R. at
5).
On March 30, 1990, Northern filed in Third District Court a
document entitled Complaint and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
5

and Alternatively a Writ of Mandamus or Declaratory Judgement,
requesting

the

court

to

1) declare

the

post-May

10,

1988

confinement illegal; 2) order the Board to release Northern on
parole to Arizona; and 3) award attorneys' fees, damages for
contract

breach,

and

other

(Petition, Addendum G).
argument,

the

relief.

(R. at

2)

Based on an evidentiary hearing and oral

district

extraordinary writ.

appropriate

court

denied

the

petition

for

an

(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Order of Dismissal, R. at 89, Addendum F).
Northern appealed the denial of his petition to the Utah Court
of Appeals, which issued an opinion affirming the decision of the
district court on January 24, 1992. (R. at 104) (Addendum B).
While this case was being appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals,
the Board paroled Northern to the State of Arizona.

(1991 Order of

Parole, Addendum H ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts pertinent

to this appeal are set out

in the

Statement of the Case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Northern sought from the district court extraordinary relief
in the nature of mandamus under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

To be entitled to extraordinary relief, he must show

that the Board did not regularly pursue its authority, which is
limited by the statutes and rules pertinent to the Board when the

6

harm occurred, specifically Rule 310 of the Board's Policies and
Procedures.
Northern is not entitled to extraordinary relief because the
Board did comply with the law.

Contrary to Northern's arguments,

Rule 310 did not require a pre-rescission hearing.

Indeed, Rule

310 allowed the Board to temporarily rescind a parole date solely
on the basis of information that there was new evidence that, if
released, Northern would present a serious risk or danger to the
community. When the Board temporarily rescinded the parole release
date, it had information in the form of a psychological report and
a report of recent drug use in a county jail indicating that
Northern had previously lied to the-Board about his serious and
ongoing abuse of drugs, and, more importantly, was still willing to
violate the law in order to abuse drugs.
In its opinion affirming the district court's denial of the
petition, the Court of Appeals correctly decided that the Board's
subjective and substantive decision

pertaining to an individual's

fitness for parole was not subject to judicial review.

This

decision is not in conflict with Foote v. Board of Pardons, 809
P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), which dealt with the Court's authority to
review alleged procedural violations by the Board, not the Board's
substantive parole decisions.

The appellate court's conclusion

that the Board's exercise of its discretionary authority is not
subject to judicial review is required not only by Utah statute but

7

also by the Utah Constitution, which expressly delegates the parole
power to the Board of Pardons.
A court, considering a petition for extraordinary writ, may
not substitute its judgment of a person's risk or dangerousness for
the Board's

judgment.

A court that did so would

improperly

exercise an executive function and violate the separation of powers
provision of the Utah Constitution.

The appellate court properly

avoided this constitutional conflict and interpreted Foote to
extend

judicial

review

via

Rule

65B

to

alleged

procedural

violations only. Because the Board did not violate its procedures
when it rescinded Northern's parole date, Northern is not entitled
to extraordinary relief and the Court of Appeals' decision should
be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
In his original petition for extraordinary relief, Northern
asserted two causes of action:

1) the Board violated its own

policies and procedures when it rescinded his parole date in 1988;
and 2) the Board's 1988 rescission of Northern's parole date
breached his 1981 parole "contract" . * Complaint and Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Alternatively a Writ of Mandamus or

Northern does not challenge on certiorari the Court of
Appeals' legal ruling that a Rule 65B action is not an appropriate
vehicle for litigating claims for breach of contract.

8

Declaratory Judgement, Case No. 90090125, Third District Court,
filed March 30, 1990 (Petition, Addendum G ) .
Northern's first cause of action essentially is a request for
relief under the mandamus provision of Rule 65B — a complaint that
the respondent has failed to act in accordance with law, thereby
harming

him.

Utah

R.

Civ.

P.

65B(e)

(1992).2

Where

the

extraordinary relief requested is in the nature of mandamus, a
court

is

limited

to determining

whether

the

respondent

has

"regularly pursued its authority," Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e)(4), which
is defined by the statutes and by agency rules in place when the
alleged harm occurred.

See Preece v. House, No. 920726-CA (Utah

App. Feb. 17, 1993) (appropriate extraordinary relief under Rule
65B(e) for Board of Pardons' failure to follow its own procedural
rule is to order Board to comply with its rule) (Addendum I).
In Preece, the Court of Appeals reviewed an order of the Third
District Court which granted a petition for habeas corpus and
ordered a prisoner's release.

At issue in the petition was the

Board's alleged failure to comply with its own rules, specifically
its responsibility to provide a written explanation for a denial of
parole.

The Court of Appeals found that the district court

2

Rule 65B was substantially reorganized in 1991 although the
language pertaining to mandamus was only technically amended. In
1990, when this petition was filed, the then existing mandamus
provision was codified at Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2) through (4),
and (e). Because of the substantive similarities between the 1990
version of the rule and the current version as it pertains to
mandamus, Respondents will cite to the current version in this
brief.
9

exceeded its authority by ordering the Petitioner's release as a
remedy for the Board's failure to comply with its procedural rules.
Preece, slip op. at 2 (Addendum I).

The appellate court remanded

the case to the district court with instructions to treat the
petition under Rule 65B(e) and to order the Board to comply with
its rules and "expeditiously . . • provide the district court and
petitioner with a written explanation of its reasons for the parole
decision."

Id.

In the district court, Petitioner Northern made a challenge
very similar to that in Preece. He claimed that the Board violated
its own rule governing rescission of a set parole date, namely Rule
310, in two ways:

(1) by failing to hold a hearing before acting

on May 9, 1988, to stay the release on parole on May 10, 1988,
pending further investigation; and (2) by rescinding his parole
date based on information that purportedly did not constitute "new
evidence" under Rule 310.

He also vaguely asserted that these

violations of Rule 310 denied him his constitutional rights.
In oral argument before the district court, Northern's counsel
described the* issues presented by his claims as follows:
It seems to me, Your Honor, that there are really three
critical issues, perhaps, I think the court may need to
decide in order to fairly adjudicate this matter. One of
them is simply did the Board of Pardons follow its own
policies and procedures under Rule 3.10 which we have
discussed previously at length with you . . . . I think
the next issue the court would look at is was it exempted
from following 3.10 by this introductory language of 655101 . . . . I think the final issue would be if the Board
violated 3.10, and is not saved under section 655-101,
what is the appropriate remedy?
10

(Tr. of Hearing before Judge Timothy Hanson, July 27, 1990, at 34,
35, R. at 102).

Faced with these issues and arguments, Judge

Hanson concluded that Rule 310fs requirements for a hearing were
not violated. He found that there was adequate information before
the Board on May 9 when it blocked the May 10 release on parole:
first, Northern had throughout his seven-year

incarceration—

indeed, until his psychological evaluation on May 5, 1988—lied
about his serious drug abuse before, during, and after commission
of the murder; second, there was evidence of ongoing drug use and
violation of drug laws and prison rules as late as February 1988.
Judge Hanson concluded that this information constituted
evidence" not available to the Board in July 1981.

"new

Since no

violation of Rule 310 had occurred, the trial court rejected the
secondary claim that violation of Rule 310 had also denied him
constitutional rights. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
Addendum F).
Northern's brief to the Utah Court of Appeals framed the issue
in this two-part manner:

"Did the Board of Pardons violate its own

procedural and substantive rules as set forth in Board of Pardons
Rule 3.10 ["Rule 3.10"], thereby denying Northern due process of
law?" Brief of Petitioner at 1, Northern v. Barnes, No. 900566-CA.
In affirming Judge Hanson's denial of extraordinary relief, the
Court of Appeals did not expressly decide whether any violation of
Rule 310 occurred.

Instead, the court held that any procedural

deficiencies were cured by the hearing held in July 1988, before
11

Northern's petition for extraordinary relief was filed.

Northern

v. Barnes. 825 P.2d at 699.
The Court of Appeals saw that other arguments on appeal
challenged the substance of the Board's decision to rescind the
parole based on the new evidence before it. But the court rejected
this "suggestion" that courts may second-guess the Board of Pardons
and essentially reweigh the evidence before the Board and determine
anew whether an inmate's parole date should be rescinded.

It is

this latter ruling that Northern challenges on certiorari.3
Before

this Court, Northern

claims once again

that the

conditions in Board Rule 310 for rescinding the May 10, 1988 parole
date were not satisfied either on May 9 or after the July 1988
hearing.

In addition, he claims that Rule 310 required the Board

to hold a rescission hearing before it acted on May 9.

These

questions are addressed in Point I, below.
Secondly,

Northern

asserts

that

erroneously declined to evaluate the

the

Court

of

Appeals

"reasonableness" of the

Board's rescission of his parole based on that evidence.

This

issue is addressed in Point II, below.
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO EXTRAORDINARY

3

For the first time in his Brief on Certiorari, Northern
suggests at page 30 that Rule 310, even if the Board complied with
its requirements, violates due process. This issue was not raised
in either the district court or the Court of Appeals. Accordingly,
it should not be addressed by this Court. Smith v. Batchelor, 832
P.2d 467, 470 n.4, (Utah 1992); Pixton v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991).
12

RELIEF SINCE THE BOARD OF PARDONS HAD NOT
VIOLATED RULE 310.
A.

Although Rule 310 did require a
hearing , it did not require the
Board to hold a hearing before
staying the 1981 parole order. Rule
310 permitted temporary rescission
of Northern's May 10 parole date,
based on information received a few
days earlier about his current risk
to the community, ongoing drug
abuse, and his lies about drug abuse
at the time of the crime•

Northern asserts that Rule 310 required the Board to hold a
hearing before it acted on May 9 to rescind the May 10, 1988 parole
date set in 1981.

This Court should reject this contention based

on the plain language of the rule itself.
Rule 310, which in 1988 governed the Board's rescission of a
parole release date, provided:
310-1.

Policy

The release or rehearing date established by the
Board of Pardons shall remain in effect except upon
written referral indicating that the offender is in
violation of the rules and regulations of the Utah State
Prison, Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any
local, state, or federal government, or new evidence is
presented that an inmate, if released, would present a
serious risk or danger to the community.
310-2.

Procedure

Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing
date, information shall be provided to the Board
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing. Upon
receipt of such information, the offender will be
scheduled for a rescission hearing.
Except under
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be
notified of all allegations and the date of the scheduled
hearing at least seven days in advance.
13

(Addendum A ) ,

Under the clear mandate of this rule, the 1981 order

setting Northern's parole release date of May 10, 1988 was to
remain in effect unless the Board received either:

(a) a written

referral about his violation of law or prison rule; or (b) new
evidence that his release would present a serious risk or danger to
the community.
In this case, the Board received information shortly before
May 10 that satisfied both prongs of this part of the rule.

The

Board had received a referral from the Duchesne County Jail
(Addendum D) stating that Northern had been found using drugs, a
violation of prison rules and state law, in February 1988, only
three months before his scheduled parole release date.

The Board

also received the May 5, 1988 psychological evaluation (Addendum
E), in which the Board learned that Northern had since 1980 lied
about his lack of drug use and abuse.

The Board learned for the

first time that Northern had been a serious drug abuser (of LSD,
cocaine, amphetamines, and marijuana) since the age of 16 and that
he was, in fact, high on LSD at the time of his crime.
Given this information, on May 9, 1988 the Board acted in
accordance with the rule by temporarily rescinding the May 10, 1988
release date. At the same time, the Board requested an additional
psychological evaluation to answer questions raised by the May 5,
1988 evaluation. (Notification of Parole Decision, dated May 9,
1988, Addendum J) (R. at 10).

The Board then scheduled a hearing

for July 8, 1988 at which Northern would have the opportunity to
14

respond.4

Even Northern admits that at this hearing, he was

permitted to address the Board of Pardons, present information, and
respond to questioning from the Board.5 Brief of Petitioner at 12.
Rule 310 does not require a hearing before an order setting a
release date is temporarily rescinded.

Petitioner's tortured

construction of the rule would prevent the Board from protecting
the public in those instances when a soon-to-be paroled inmate
engages in unlawful activity or is found to be dangerous shortly
before the original parole release date.

As a matter of public

policy, this Court should reject his distortion of the plain
meaning of the rule.
B.

The Board had before it "new" evidence,
within the meaning of that term in Rule
310, that release of Northern in May 1988
would have presented a serious risk of
danger to the community.

4

Had the Board reversed its rescission at this hearing,
instead of affirming it, Petitioner still would have had a remedy.
The Board could have granted him credit for the time he had served
in prison since May 10, 1988.
5

Under the rules, a rescission hearing is classified as a
"full hearing" at which the inmate is guaranteed a personal
appearance "in which all the facts of the case are reviewed,
evidence is presented and statements are taken from involved
parties." Utah Admin. Code R270-306-2 (1987-88). As Petitioner
admitted, he received these rights at the July hearing. Just
because the July 8 hearing was labelled a "special appearance"
rather than "rescission" hearing does not constitute a violation of
the rule. Both rescission and special appearance hearings are
"full hearings" under Rule 306 and the same opportunities of
notice, personal appearance, and ability to present evidence are
guaranteed. Additionally, Petitioner has not alleged that he was
misled or confused by the designation "special appearance." He
knew the Board was going to discuss the rescission.
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In his Findings of Fact, Judge Hanson found that the use of
marijuana

at

the Duchesne

County Jail

in February

1988 and

information contained in a psychological evaluation dated May 5,
1988 was "new information in that it was not available to the Board
of Pardons on July 8, 1981." Findings of Fact 6, 10 (R. at 90, 92)
(Addendum F).

Under the standard of review adopted by this Court,

factual findings will be set aside only if they are clearly
erroneous.

State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1992)

I quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991)).
Petitioner does not contend that these factual findings are
clearly erroneous but he (a) protests their designation as "new
evidence;" and (b) states that they are not the "best" evidence of
his dangerousness or risk to society.
The district court defined

"new evidence" as information

arising between the time the Board initially set the release date,
in this case July 1981, and the scheduled release date.

This is

the obvious meaning of the term in the context of Rule 310.
Board should not be bound by facts frozen in time.

The

In order to

fulfill its constitutional and statutory responsibilities and
determine if an inmate is ready for release, the Board must be able
to consider all conduct indicative of a person's dangerousness that
occurs, or becomes known, since the Board's initial setting of a
release date.

This essential flexibility is provided by Judge

Hanson's commonsense interpretation of Rule 310.
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In his brief before this Court, Northern seems to agree that
this is the appropriate definition of "new evidence."

He states

that the "plain and literal meaning of the term 'new evidence' [in
Rule 310] is evidence which was previously concealed from the Board
of Pardons or specific, affirmative acts that occurred or became
known subsequent to an inmate's last review or consideration by the
Board of Pardons."

Brief of Petitioner at 29.

In the psychological evaluation, which was received on May 5,
1988, only five days before the scheduled release date, the Board
learned that Northern had previously concealed and lied about his
drug history.

The evidence available to the Board

in 1981

overwhelmingly indicated that Petitioner had no drug problem and
that drugs were not involved in the crime.

In the June 13, 1980

report that was before the Board in 1981 when the May 10, 1988
release date was originally set, the diagnostic agent stated: "Mr.
Northern reports only one prior arrest as a juvenile and no history
whatsoever of drug or alcohol abuse.

There is no available

information to suggest that either alcohol or drugs played a part
in the current crime . . . ."
Addendum K) (emphasis added).

(June 1980 Diagnostic Report,
In a 90-day diagnostic report

prepared two weeks later, the investigator likewise reported that
Northern had no significant drug use problem.

(July 28, 1980 90-

day Diagnostic Report, Addendum L). The 1988 psychological report,
in startling language, made it clear to the Board that Northern
had, in fact been deeply involved in drug abuse.
17

At 16 Mr, Northern left home to wander the western states
and became more deeply involved with drugs and people
using drugs. He stated that he was high on LSD at the
time he commited [sic] his crime. Among drugs that Mr.
Northern
admitted
to using were LSD, cocaine,
amphetamines, and marijuana. He has tried other drugs
such as downers, but stated he found them unsatisfactory.
(Addendum E).
This

information

of

concealment

of

his

drug

abuse was

indisputably "new evidence," under either Northern's formulation or
under the more simple definition used by Judge Hanson.

Thus, the

Board complied with Rule 310.
The report of Northern's February 1988 use of marijuana at the
Duchesne County Jail constituted additional "new evidence" under
both Judge Hanson's definition and Northern's own formulation as a
"specific or affirmative [act] that occurred . . . subsequent to
[Northern's] last review."
Significantly,

besides

constituting

new

evidence,

this

information of drug use in February 1988 also separately satisfied
the alternative basis in Rule 310 permitting rescission of a
release date based on a "written referral" indicating a violation
of law or prison rules.

This information alone gave the Board a

lawful reason to temporarily rescind the parole date of May 10,
1988. Thus, the Board's actions on May 9 did not violate Rule 310.
At page 29 of his brief to this Court, Northern argues that,
even if this evidence is new it is not "the best evidence" of
Northern's threat to the community.

In essence, as the Court of

Appeals recognized, this is actually an argument, premised on Foote
18

v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), that a court can
substitute its judgment about whether to parole an inmate for the
Board's judgment.
not

sanction

As discussed below under Point II, Foote does

such second-guessing

of the Board's

substantive

decisions about parole, which is, in any event, barred by the state
constitution and statute.
The actions of the Board in rescinding Northern's parole date
comported not only with the procedural requirements of Rule 310 but
with notions of common sense. The Board is charged by law not just
with the obligation to determine an individual's fitness for parole
but also with the duty to protect the public.

In May 1988, the

Board came upon new evidence that Northern had previously withheld
information from the Board and that he had recently violated the
law.

Using its experience and expertise, the Board decided that

this new evidence indicated that Northern would present a serious
risk or danger to the community if he were released on May 10,
1988.
II•

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE BOARD'S SUBSTANTIVE PAROLE
DECISIONS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN AN ACTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY
RELIEF*

In addition to his claim that Rule 310 was violated by the
Board in his case, Northern contends that, even if Rule 310's
requirements were satisfied, a court can reweigh the evidence and
redetermine whether it warranted rescission of his May 10, 1988
parole date. Brief of Petitioner at 29-30. Northern asserts that
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this Court's decision in Foote subjects this discretionary decision
of the Board to such judicial review. .Ici. at 21.
This is the same argument he made unsuccessfully to the Utah
Court

of

Appeals.

That

court

disagreed

with

Northern's

interpretation of Foote, stating that Foote dealt solely with
procedural due process issues.

Northern, 825 P.2d at 699.

In

addition, the Court of Appeals interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 77-275(3) (Supp. 1992) to prohibit

judicial review of the Board's

exercise of its discretionary authority to determine whether or not
an inmate should be released to the community.

See Northern. 825

P.2d at 699; see also Foote, 808 P.2d at 735 (the number of years
a defendant will spend in prison is left to the

"unfettered

discretion of the board of pardons"); State v. Mondraqon, 107 N.M.
421, 759 P.2d 1003, 1004 (N.M. App. 1988) ("While there may be
regulations on the manner of the exercise of the power, the
ultimate right to pardon is unrestrained by any consideration other
than the conscience, wisdom, and sense of public duty of the
governor.").
Foote was brought as an original Petition for a Writ granting
Extraordinary

Relief directly in this Court, challenging the

procedures used by the Board of Pardons.

Foote, an inmate,

contended "that the manner in which his parole hearings [had] been
conducted [had] deprived him of procedural due process."
808 P.2d at 734.

Foote,

Because the facts relating to the conduct of

parole hearings were undocumented, this Court remanded the case to
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the district court to flush out the "facts concerning the
procedures followed by the board,"

Id. at 735 (emphasis added),

and to obtain a ruling on what is procedurally required.6

Because

the Utah Constitution guarantees inmates due process protection
during original parole grant hearings before the Board, this Court
declared that habeas corpus review of the Board's actions in
conducting those hearings is available via an extraordinary writ,
notwithstanding the fact that section 77-27-5(3) bars a direct
appeal from the substantive parole decisions of the Board.

Id.

In the instant case, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that
Northern's substantive claims went not to the "procedural due
process issues outlined in Foote, but to the reasonableness of the
Board's decision . . . ."

Northern, 825 P.2d at 699.

Thus, the

Northern court found that the language in Foote, stating that
habeas corpus review of Board actions was available to challenge
the manner in which parole hearings were conducted, did not apply
to Northern insofar as he was not challenging the manner in which
the rescission hearing was held, but the result that was reached.
This is a correct interpretation of Foote, not just because
the Foote Court spoke in terms of procedural due process, but, more
fundamentally, because limiting the appropriate scope of judicial
review of Board actions to allegations of procedural violations,

6

The issue of what procedural protection is required by the
Utah Constitution at parole grant hearings is currently before this
Court in Labrum v. Board of Pardons. No. 920022.
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rather

than

substantive decisions, is mandated

by the state

constitution and statute.
In perhaps the central, and most controversial, paragraph of
the opinion, the Court of Appeals stated in Northern that state law
barred judicial review of the Board's subjective and substantive
decisions.
The Board's right to rely on any factors known in
May 1988, or later adduced at the July 1988 hearing, and
the weight to be afforded such factors in deciding
whether Northern posed a societal risk, as well as
whether an order of restitution was appropriate, are all
matters within the discretion of the Board. They are
precisely the kinds of issues that are not subject to
judicial review under section 77-27-5(3). Accordingly we
hold that habeas corpus is not available in this case as
a post release remedy to modify the release date ordered
by the Board.
Northern, 825 P.2d at 699; accord Preece v. House, No. 920726-CA,
(Utah App. Feb. 17, 1993) (Appendix I).

The Court tied this

statement to section 77-27-5(3), which states that decisions of the
Board of Pardons are final and are not subject to judicial review.
However, the unreviewability of the Board's substantive parole
decisions is not just a creature of the legislature. It is instead
mandated by the interplay of two separate provisions of the Utah
Constitution. Article VII, section 12 specifically creates a Board
of Pardons and Parole to make these substantive decisions about
parole. Article V explicitly divides the powers of the government
into

three

distinct

departments

and

prohibits

one

of

those

departments from exercising functions appertaining to another.
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A.

Article VII, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution grants the Board of Pardons
exclusive authority to make parole
decisions.

The Board of Pardons and Parole was initially created as a
Board of Pardons, composed of the Governor, the Attorney General,
and the Justices of the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Const, art. VII,
S 12 (1896, amended 1992).
remit

fines,

commute

This entity had the sole authority to

punishments,

and

grant

pardons

after

convictions. .Id. An early Utah Supreme Court case held the Board
of Pardons had exclusive authority to grant paroles, the legal
equivalent to a commutation.

State ex rel. Bishop v. State Board

of Corrections, 16 Utah 478, 52 P. 1090 (1898); accord Cardisco v.
Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 P. 216, 218 (1937).
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Bishop, the parole
system has been administered by the Board of Pardons.

In many

states and in the federal government, the power of executive
clemency is administered by the chief of the executive branch, that
is, by the governor or the president, and the parole system is
administered by a separate, legislatively created entity.

As the

very term suggests, executive clemency, which includes pardons,
commutations7, and remissions is inherently an executive function.
The constitutional grant of exclusive authority to the Board
to decide when and if an inmate is ready to return to the community
7

As previously stated, parole also is a part of executive
clemency, being in legal effect a commutation. Bishop, 57 P. at
1090.
23

before the end of his sentence makes good sense in light of the
•discretionary, predictive nature of that decision.

From a policy

perspective, an executive body, rather than the judiciary, is
better able to make this determination.

As stated by Justice

Folland in Cardisco, the Board "has better facilities and better
opportunity than the trial court to learn about the offender, and
as to his character, experience, training, the past criminal
record, if any, former associations, family connections, condition
of his health, etc."

Cardisco, 64 P.2d at 222 (Folland, J.,

concurring).
The Court of Appeal's holding in the instant case is in accord
with

the

constitutional

delegation

of

authority,

prior Utah

decisions, and the historical purposes and functions of the Board
of Pardons.

As the Board was better able to look at a person's

character and reformation than a trial court in 1937 when Cardisco
was determined, so the Board is still better able today to make
that determination. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed
out, the parole-release decision is not a factual determination
like those made by courts.
The parole-release decision, however, is more
subtle and depends on an amalgam of elements, some
of which are factual but many of which are purely
subjective appraisals by the Board members based
upon their experience with the difficult and
sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of
parole release . . . .
Greenholz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (quoting Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert24

-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 803,
813 (1961)).

Finally, because the Board administers the entire

parole system, thus specializing in prisoner rehabilitation issues,
it is better able than a court in an isolated case to develop the
necessary expertise and to make parole decisions for all inmates
that are consistent with each other.
In sum, the people of this state have given the Board of
Pardons the constitutional authority to determine whether an inmate
has been rehabilitated sufficiently to return to the community
without presenting a serious risk or danger.

In rescinding

Northern's parole date based on new evidence and evidence of his
recent violation of drug laws, the Board exercised this authority.
B.

The separation of powers provision in article V of
the Utah Constitution precludes the judiciary from
exercising functions delegated to the executive
branch, including parole decisions by the Board of
Pardons•

In light of the Board's exclusive constitutional authority to
make parole decisions, a court's reweighing of the evidence would
violate

the

separation

of

powers

provision

of

the

Utah

Constitution. The article VII, section 12 power to grant parole is
meaningless if it is just the ministerial power to sign the release
order. The Board's authority, to be meaningful, must also embrace
the power to determine what factors are relevant in the parole
release decision, their relative importance in each case, and what
weight to give each item of evidence.

If the judiciary takes that

power on itself, it would effectively be making the parole decision
25

delegated to the Board of Pardons, an agency of the executive
branch.

See Kimball v. Grantsvilie City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1

(1899) (delegation of power to one branch implies inhibition
against its exercise by another branch).
As noted under Point I, the Board of Pardons does not claim to
be above the law.
constitutionally

The Board recognizes that this Court can

compel

extraordinary writ.

it to follow the

law by issuing an

However, the state constitution and section

77-27-5(3) preclude judicial review of the substantive decisions of
the Board concerning parole, even if that review is sought by way
of a Rule 65B(e) petition.
concluded

here,

a

court

As the Court of Appeals correctly
faced

with

such

a

petition

for

extraordinary relief is limited to determining whether the Board
"has regularly pursued its authority."
(1992).

Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(e)

The purpose of mandamus is not to interfere with the

"functions or the policies of other departments of government," or
allow a court to substitute its judgment for that of an agency by
telling the agency how to decide. Wright Development, Inc. v. City
of Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232, at 233 (Utah 1980); See also Olson v.
Salt Lake City School District. 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully request
that this Court affirm the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.
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Sec. 12. [Board of Pardons and Parole - Appointment - Powers and
procedures - Governor's powers and duties - Legislature's powers.]
(1)
There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The
Governor shall appoint the members of the board with the consent of
the Senate. The terms of office shall be as provided by statute.
(2) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and
upon other conditions as provided by statute, may grant parole,
remit fines, forfeitures and restitution orders, commute
punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, in all cases
except treason and impeachments, subject to regulations as provided
by statute.
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be
remitted and a commutation, parole, or pardon may not be granted
except after a full hearing before the board, in open session, and
after previous notice of the time and place of the hearing has been
given.
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the reasons
therefor in each case, and the dissent of any member who may
disagree shall be recorded and filed as provided by statute with
all papers used upon the hearing.
(3) (a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all
cases of convictions for offenses against the state except treason
or conviction on impeachment. These respites or reprieves may not
extend beyond the next session of the board. At that session, the
board shall continue or determine the respite or reprieve, commute
the punishment, or pardon the offense as provided in this section.
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may
suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to the
Legislature at its next annual general session, when the
Legislature shall pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its
execution. If the Legislature takes no action on the case before
adjournment of that session, the sentence shall be executed.

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments,
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.

Section 1. [Judicial powers - Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme
court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the
district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by
statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and
such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record.
Courts not of record shall also be established by statute.

77-27-5. Board of Pardons authority.
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons shall determine by majority
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter
and other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences
in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities
which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections,
and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise
limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution
ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted,
or their sentences commuted or terminated.
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct
hearings. The chairperson shall appoint members to the panels in
any combination and in accordance with rules promulgated by the
board, except in hearings involving commutation and pardons. The
chairperson may participate on any panel and when doing so is
chairperson of the panel. The chairperson of the board may
designate the chairperson for any other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or
restitution remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or
sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the board
or the board's appointed examiner in open session. Any action taken
under this subsection other than by a majority of the board shall
be affirmed by a majority of the board.
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full
hearing before the board.
(2) (a)
In the case of original parole grant hearings,
rehearings, and parole revocation hearings, timely prior notice of
the time and place of the hearing shall be given to the defendant,
the county attorney's office responsible for prosecution of the
case, the sentencing court, law enforcement officials responsible
for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and whenever possible,
the victim or the victim's family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family
shall include information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any
related rules made by the board under that section. This
information shall be provided in terms that are reasonable for the
lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving
paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence,
restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are
not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents
the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment.
(4)

This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or

limitation of the governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in
all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, except
treason or conviction on impeachment. However, respites or
reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the Board of
Pardons and the board, at that session, shall continue or terminate
the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or
pardon the offense as provided. In the case of conviction for
treason, the governor may suspend execution of the sentence until
the case is reported to the Legislature at its next session. The
Legislature shall then either pardon or commute the sentence, or
direct its execution.
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions
offenders serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have
restitution ordered, or have their fines or forfeitures remitted,
or their sentences commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons
shall consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to
make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards
and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole,
pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or commutation or
termination of sentence.

Utah Admin. Code R270-310 (Board of Pardons Policies and Procedures
Manual Number 3.10) (1986)
Purpose:

To establish a process for the taking of a
release or rehearing date once it has been
set, and to allow for the designation of a
hearing officer to hear such cases.

Policy:

The release or rehearing date established by
the Board of Pardons shall remain in effect
except upon written referral indicating that
the offender is in violation of the rules and
regulations of the Utah State Prison,
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any
local, state, or federal government, or new
evidence is presented that an inmate, if
released, would present a serious risk or
danger to the community.

Procedure:

Prior to the rescinding of a parole or
rehearing date, information shall be provided
to the Board establishing the basis for the
rescission hearing.
Upon receipt of such
information, the offender will be scheduled
fora rescission hearing.
Except under
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will
be notified of all allegations and the date of
the scheduled hearing at least seven days in
advance.
In the event
rescind the
notification
continue the
available for

of an escape, the Board will
inmate's date upon official
of escape from custody and
hearing until the inmate is
appearance.

A Board of Pardons hearing officer shall hear
all matters when the violation consists of a
new complaint or conviction for a non-violent
felony, misdemeanor,
or
an
adjudicated
violation of rules or regulations.
All
felonies involving crimes against persons or
other violent felonies shall be heard by the
Board.
The hearing officer shall conduct the hearing
and make an interim decision to be reviewed,
along with a summary report of the hearing, by
the Board members. Any decision by a hearing
officer shall be binding and in full force and
effect until reviewed by Board members, who

will make the final decision by approving,
modifying, or overturning a hearing officer's
decision. The decision is then entered into
the record at a regular scheduled Board
meeting and the offender is then informed by
mail of the results. He is not afforded a
personal appearance for this review.
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Kendall a NORTHERN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
T.

N. Eldon BARNES, Warden, Utah State
Prison and the Department of Corrections through the Board of Pardons,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 900566-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 24, 1992.

Inmate petitioned for habeas corpus
after his original parole date was rescinded. The Third District Court, Salt take
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., denied the
petition, and inmate appealed. While appeal was pending, inmate was paroled.
The Court of Appeals, Bench, PJ., held
that (1) inmate's request for declaratory
relief was not moot following his release on
parole, and (2) decision of Board of Pardons
to not give inmate earlier release was an
exercise of its discretion.
Affirmed.
Billings, J., concurred in the result
See also 814 P.2d 1148.

1. Courts *»207.1
In general, purpose of extraordinary
relief under extraordinary writs rule is to
test lawfulness of imprisonment, and propriety of any related proceedings, by forcing judicial hearing. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
65B.
2. Courts *=»207.1
Extraordinary writs rule does not provide procedure to bring contract claims.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65B.
3. Habeas Corpus *=*826(2)
Inmate's demand for immediate parole
was moot where parole was granted subsequent to filing of appeal from denial of
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 65B.

4. Declaratory Judgment *»84
A parolee's request for declaratory relief as to unlawfulness of his confinement
was not rendered moot by fact that parole
was granted subsequent to filing of appeal;
parolee was alleging that if Board of Pardons had not violated his due process
rights in rescinding his original parole date
he would have completed his parole, and
parolee was claiming credit against his parole period for time served while incarcerated after his original parole date.
U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 5, 14.
5. Criminal Law •=-1216.1(2)
Discretion to give credit for time
served lies solely with the Board of Pardons. U.C.A.1953, 77-27-6(3).
6. Prisons «=>15(1)
Power to reduce or terminate sentences is vested exclusively within Board of
Pardons. U.C.A.1953, 77-27-5(3).
7. Pardon and Parole «=*59
Any of alleged procedural deficiencies
in rescinding inmate's original parole date
were remedied by full rescission hearing
held before Board of Pardons. U.S.C.A.
ConstAmends. 5, 14.
8. Habeas Corpus *=>516
Habeas corpus was not available as
postrelease remedy to modify release date
ordered by the Board of Pardons, even
though parolee's original scheduled parole
date was rescinded by Board of Pardons
one day before parole date; Board had
right to rely on any factors known at the
time, including parolee's drug history, or
later adduced at hearing ordered and had
discretion to determine weight to be given
to the factors. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-202(1),
(SXc), (5), 77-27-5(3).

Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Lorenzo K. Miller, and
Kirk M. Torgensen, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellees.
Before BENCH, PJ., and BILLINGS and
GARFF, JJ.
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OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Kendall Q. Northern unsuccessfully petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas
corpus following a decision of the Board of
Pardons (the Board) to rescind his original
parole date. Northern appealed the trial
court's decision, but was subsequently paroled during the pendency of this appeal.
We affirm.
FACTS
In 1980, Northern, an eighteen-year-old
drifter, pleaded guilty to second degree
murder and aggravated robbery for his
participation in the shooting death of a cab
driver earlier that same year. Northern
was sentenced to two five-to-life sentences
at the Utah State Prison. He later admitted he was under the influence of LSD at
the time of the shooting, and had been
deeply involved in drugs.
After Northern had been imprisoned for
a year, the Board met and granted him a
May 10, 1988 parole date. The Board reconsidered Northern's status in 1984, and
determined that the 1988 parole date would
remain intact despite evidence that Northern had used drugs at the prison during his
incarceration.
In 1986, Northern was transferred to the
Duchesne County Jail where he attained
trustee status. Over the next two years,
Northern was allowed to work unsupervised outside the jail. In early 1988, with
only a few months remaining before his
projected parole, jail authorities discovered
that Northern was again using drugs.
This information was reported to the prison
and received by the Board petore his parole
date.
Two months before his parole date, a
psychological assessment of Northern was
made at the request of the Board. The
report indicated that Northern had been a
1. The administrative rules of the Board state, as
policy, that M[a]n offender shall be notified at
least seven calendar days in advance of a hearing, except in extraordinary circumstances, and
shall be specifically advised as to the purpose of
the hearing." See Utah AdminJl 655-202
(1991).

heavy drug user, and had been unable to
deal with life's stresses without drugs.
The report also said Northern acknowledged that his drug dependence was a major factor contributing to his antisocial behavior. Before the report was published,
the Board also attempted to obtain Northern's consent to additional terms of release
that would have included drug testing. On
the advice of his father, however, Northern
refused to consent to the new conditions.
On May 9, 1988, the Board rescinded
Northern's May 10 parole date, pending
further review, and ordered another psychological evaluation. The need for another psychological evaluation and complete
prison progress report was listed in the
written notice by the Board as the ground
for rescinding Northern's original parole
date. The supplemental assessment focused on potential problems affecting
Northern's adjustment into society posed
by his relationship with his father. A full
rescission hearing was then scheduled for
July 8, 1988.1
At that hearing, the Board determined
that Northern continued to be a risk to
society, and refused to grant him parole at
that time. The Board scheduled a rehearing for May 1990, and Northern was returned to the Duchesne County Jail. Two
months later, however, he escaped and fled
to Canada. The Board then rescinded the
rehearing scheduled for May 1990. Northern was captured and returned to prison on
October 6, 1989.
Northern petitioned for extraordinary relief and habeas corpus under Rule 65B(bX2)
and (4), and (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.1 The petition prayed for (1)
declaratory relief as to the unlawfulness of
Northern's confinement since May 10,
1988, (2) a demand for his immediate release, and (3) damages in excess of $10,000
for "breach of contract" on the ground that
2. Rule 65B was completely reorganized after
Northern's petition was filed. See Utah RXiv.P.
65B (amended effective September 1, 1991) and
advisory committee note.
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a parole date created a legally binding
agreement on the State. After a hearing,
the trial court denied the petition, and
Northern filed a notice of appeal. The
Board subsequently set a July 1991 parole
date, and required restitution of $26,350 by
Northern as a condition of parole. Northern agreed to the new conditions, and was
paroled on July 9, 1991, while this appeal
was pending.
ANALYSIS
[1-3] In general, the purpose of extraordinary relief under Rule 65B is to test
the lawfulness of imprisonment, and the
propriety of any related proceedings, by
forcing a judicial hearing. See Ziegler v.
Miliken, 583 P^d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1978).
Northern presents no authority, however,
for extending the purposes of extraordinary writs as a procedure to bring contract
claims. We also conclude that the demand
for Northern's immediate parole is moot
because parole was granted subsequent to
the filing of this appeal. Spain v. Stewart,
639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981).1 We are
therefore left only with Northern's prayer
for declaratory relief as to the unlawfulness of his "confinement"
[4] Inasmuch as Northern is no longer
incarcerated, we must consider whether his
request for declaratory relief is also moot
Courts have reviewed habeas corpus petitions that would have been otherwise rendered moot by the release of a prisoner
when the prisoner suffers "collateral legal
consequences" from a conviction, such as
"the use of the conviction to impeach the
petitioner's character or as a factor in determining a sentence in a future trial, as
well as petitioner's inability to vote, engage
in certain businesses, or serve on a jury."
Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah
1981).

rights in rescinding his original parole date.
Thus, the request for declaratory relief becomes a question of whether Northern's
extended parole status was a collateral legal consequence of alleged due process violations. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236, 243, 83 S.Ct 373, 377, 9 LEd.2d
285 (1963), the United States Supreme
Court held that release on parole does not
render a petition for habeas corpus moot
because parole "imposes conditions which
significantly confine and restrain [a parolee's] freedom." Since parole imposes conditions of confinement and Northern's parole status past May 1991 is a consequence
of rescinding his original parole date, we
proceed to address his claim for credit
against his parole period for time served
while incarcerated after his original parole
date.
[5,61 In prior cases, discretion to give
credit for time served was determined to lie
solely with the Board. In State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 277 (Utah 1985), the
reason given for rejecting a similar argument demanding credit for time served was
the Board's discretion to determine the period of time to be served. Likewise, in
State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 208-09
(Utah App.1988), we held that Utah courts
have no authority to grant credit for time
served prior to conviction since the power
to reduce or terminate sentences is vested
exclusively with the Board under Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1990).

Northern argues that he would have
completed his parole in May 1991, if the
Board had not violated his due process

[7] Northern suggests that the Board's
exercise of this discretionary authority is
now subject to judicial review under the
recent case of Foote v. Utah Board of
Pardons, 808 P^2d 734 (Utah 1991). We
disagree. In Foote, a prisoner sought an
extraordinary writ, contending "that the
manner in which his parole hearings have
been conducted [had] deprived him of procedural due process." Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that, under the Utah
Constitution, an inmate is entitled to due

3. Although moot questions are generally not
considered on appeal due to the judicial policy
against advisory opinions, courts have reached
the merits of an issue that is technically moot,
but is "of wide concern, affects the public inter-

est, is likely to recur in a similar manner, and,
because of the brief time any one person is
affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial
review...." Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896,
899 (Utah 1981).
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process in proceedings before the Board.
Id. at 735. The supreme court then referred the case to a trial court to ascertain
factually "the procedures followed by the
board" and to decide what is procedurally
required in "the conduct of the parole hearings." Id. Since Northern was afforded
full procedural due process by the July 8,
1988 hearing, any of the alleged procedural
deficiencies in rescinding his original parole
date were remedied before this petition
was filed. Northern's claim relates, therefore, not to the procedural due process
issues outlined in Foote, but to the reasonableness of the Board's decision in not
granting Northern credit for the time
served beyond his original parole date.
[8] Termination of Northern's sentence
is triggered by "completion of three years
on parole outside of confinement and without violation ... unless the person is earlier terminated by the Board of Pardons.9'
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(1) (1990).
"Any time spent in confinement awaiting a
hearing ... concerning revocation of parole
constitutes service of sentence" rather
than time on parole. Section 76-3202(3Xc). Since the Board has discretion to
parole or discharge an inmate at any time,
see section 76-3-202(5), it could have given
Northern a parole period of less than three
years and thereby credited him for the time
served while incarcerated beyond his original parole date. We deem the Board's
decision to not give Northern an earlier
release date an exercise of its discretion.
The Board's right to rely on any factors
known in May 1988, or later adduced at the
July 1988 hearing, and the weight to be
afforded such factors in deciding whether
Northern posed a societal risk, as well as
whether an order of restitution was appropriate, are all matters within the discretion
of the Board. They are precisely the kinds
of issues that are not subject to judicial
review under section 77-27-5(3). Accordingly, we hold that habeas corpus is not
available in this case as a post release
remedy to modify the release date ordered
by the Board.
We have reviewed the remaining issues
raised on appeal and deem them to be

without merit See State v. Carter, 776
P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (it is within our
discretion to "analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or
claim raised").
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of the writ is
affirmed.
GARFF, J., concurs.
BILLINGS, J., concurs in the result
f O f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM!

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
•.

William Eluie CASTNER, II and Bonnie
Lee Castner, Defendants and
Appellants.
No. 910275-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 24, 1992.

Driver and passenger were convicted
in the Eighth District Court, Duchesne
County, Dennis L. Draney, J., of drug-related offenses. Driver and passenger appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held
that (1) request to search for second vehicle identification number on door post
was not reasonably related to issuance of
speeding ticket; (2) driver voluntarily consented to search of vehicle; (3) taint from
illegal search for door post number had
dissipated; and (4) consent to search vehicle extended to contents of containers
found in vehicle and trunk.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., concurred in result only.
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION fJP*

ra

KENDALL NORTHERN

•"••

TOrORDi.R

OF PAROLE

f M M l I A T r - U T A H STATE PRISON NO. 15009

PRIVATE

The matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or expiration of sentence having come before tr
Utah State Board of Pardons In a regularly jnrriliilnl himimi on lliB—fl,ttLi
day of J u l y 1 3 1 and tr
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to appearance and the Board having heard V
case, issues the following order:
It is herby ordered that
K^ndil! Northern
b § p a r o l e d f r o m t h e pun i $h ment and sentenc
heretofore imposed upon him by a judge of the 3rd
Judical District Court in and for the County of Sa 11 Lt
for the crime of
C r i m i n a l ^ H o m i c i d e , Murder i n t h e , 2 n d d e g r e e , 1 s t degree

felony(5 y£ars - l i f e ) Aggravated Robbery, i s t degree (5 years - l i f e )
Consecutively
The parole shall not become effective until the
10th
day nf
Hay
19 J U
The applicant agrees to the following conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by signing the certificate. Tl
parole agreement or contract shall be administered by the duly authorized agent of the Utah State Adult Probatic
and Parole Department in and for the Utah State Board of Pardons.
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant shall be quilty of any infractions of the rul
and regulations of the Utah State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah State Prise
or is found to be In violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then tr
Order of Parole or Termination of Sentence is revoked and becomes null and void.
Dated this

ath

day of

Julx

19

***

By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this_2Lb
day of J u l v
1981
reduced its decision in this matter to writing and hereby affix my signature
Executive Secretary for and on beh;
ure as Execut^ueSecretary
of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.
GARY
f\RY L. WEBSTER, Executive Secrete
PAROLE AGREEMENT
I,
KENDALL NORTHERN
conditions of my parole:

\

Hereby agree to abide by the followii

1. I will make a written report, in person, to my Supervising Officer by the fifth day of each and every mont
or more often if requested to do so.
2. I will follow my Supervising Officer's instructions.
3. I will submit to a search of my person, auto, place of residence of any other property under my control
any time of the day or night, without a warrant, upon reasonable cause, as ascertained by in agent of Adi
Probation and Parole, to insure compliance with the conditions of parole.
4. I will seek and maintain legitimate employment and/or participate in a program approved by my Supervisn
Officer.
5. I will obey all local, State Mnd Federtl laws, and at all times conduct myself as a responsible, law-abidh
citizen. I further agree to report any arrests or citations to my Supervising Officer within 72 hours of o
currence.
6. I will abstain from the illegal use, possession or distribution of narcotics, dangerous drugs, controlled su
stances or related paraphernalia. I further agree to submit to urinalysis or other tests for narcotics or Chen
cat agents upon the request of my Supervising Officer.
7. I wilt not receive, possess, transport, or have under my control any firearm, explosive or other dangero
weapon.
8. I will obtain written consent from Utah Adult Probation and Parole before leaving the State of Utah. It
expressly acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written authority from Adult Prob
tion ana Parole that I hereby waive extradition, from any state in which I may be found, tc the State
Utah.

9. I will inform my Supervising Officer of my intent to change employment/residence.
10. To avoid association with any person who nas oeen convicted of a felony.
11.1 will abide by the following special conditions:

r\ r> <-\ >» r >
J

w

I understand and agree that should I violate any of the above conditions, falsify reports required of me, or f
to follow the orders of my Supervising Officer, I shall be subject to BrrM as provided by law.
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DUCHESNE COUNTY JAIL
INMATE INFRACTION REPORT
TYPE OF INFRACTION
Using Controlled Substance

RULE #

INMATES NAME
Ken North*™
«15009
DATE AND TIME OCCURRED
LOCATION 0? OCCURRENCE
2-23-88
Duchesne County Jail
TOl
DATE & TIME REPORTING
HOUSING
Sheriff Clair Poulson
2-25-PS
*9
DETAILS!

* OF PRIORS

On 2-25-88 Marijuana was brought into the Duchesne County
Jail by a County Inmate. Joon further investigation it was found
that inmate William Byrd obtained a drug and gave some of it to
inmte Ken Northern. Innate Northern admitted to using the drug.

REPORTING OFFICERSr
FOLLOW

Sgt veldon Lefler

UP INVESTIGATION!

TIMEl
2-25-88
Inmate Northern admitted to smoking the Marijuana and was
placed on dead lock down for 5 days with the loss of visiting and
phone privileges.

DISPOSITION!

DATE!

MINOR INFRACTION (CLASS C)

SIGNATURE

DATE

DISPOSITION! CRJ**NAfc-4<I0LATI0NS (CLASS A) AND/OR MAJOR
INFRACT 10W^(CLASSJ^
Northern was olaced on lock) down for 5 days.
SIGNATURE^ /

DA?i~"

JATIOW^^I^
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUAT
NAME: Kendall Quinn Northern
DATE: 5 May 1988
USP#: 15009

C^rt &eX&^
-r *ZtfF
**kOP^

or

REASON .... EVALUATION: Request of the Utah State Board of Pardons to aid ii i determining
suitability ' c f inmate for release on p ar ole
ASSESSMENT MODALITIES USED: Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Driggs
Developmental Inventory, BIPolar Psychological Inventory Report, Psychological Interview.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Mr. Northern is the youngest of four children born to Donald
and Claire Northern. He is a well-nourished, healthy-looking white male 26 years of
age* He reports his childhood was fairly uneventful except that he was always heavy
and big for his age. His size appears to have caused him difficulty psychologically
since he felt he never could fit in with others and attributes his Initiation into the
drug culture to the fact that "they would accept anybody, just as long as they took
drugs." Mr. Northern's home life was reported as stable with major moves to Arizona
and California as a youth. At 16 Mr. Northern left home to wander the western states
and became more deeply involved with drugs and people using drugs. He stated that he
was high on LSD at the time he commited his crime. Among drugs that Mr. Northern
admitted to using were LSD, cocaine, amphetamines, and marijuana. He has tried other
drugs such as downers, but stated he found them unsatisfactory. He said he had no
alcohol abuse problem. He 1s single with no children.
A S a p r | S o n inmate Mr. Northern has had disciplinary write ups for his drug usage,
but that behavior has been absent from his jacket for at least the past four years.
He is presently incarcerated at the Duchesne County Jail where he is reported to be
a model inmate according to staff. He was transferred to the Duchesne facility two
years ago as a protective measure. While at the Utah State Prison and Duchesne, Mr.
Northern maintained an excellent volunteer and work record.
INTERVIEW BEHAVIOR: Mr. Northern was very verbal ai id cooperative during lltllll! te assessment interview. It was obvious that he was anxious about the situation, bi it sooi i
calmed down after venting his frustrations about the status of his upcoming parole.
He was quite open about his past history and reflective about the consequences of
his past crime. He was very insistant about having drug therapy in addition to any
mental health therapy ordered by the Board, viewing his dnig dependancy as a major
factor in his anti-social behavior.
INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING: No I.Q. tests were administered to Mr. Northern at this
time. However, he presents himself as an articulate, intelligent, and well-read
individual. This impression 1s consistent with earlier testing which placed his
overall IQ at 129 (superior range). While at the prison Mr. Northern completed his
Associate of Arts in Business degree and three technical training courses offered
by the prison.
PAGE 1 v. *
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PERSONALITY INTEGRATION: Testing showed that Mr. Northern was honest in answering
test questions and tended to be overly truthful. He definitely feels proud about
his abilities and has high self-esteem, security, self-satisfaction, and a positive
self-image. He displays an open attitude in listening to and accepting help, and
has a willingness to discuss himself and his problems and cooperate with professional
health-care deliverers. He is mildly independent, non-conforming and may have
difficulty in expressing anger or hostility in a modulated fashion. He is energe It: ic
and active with rebellious traits in his attitudes and behaviors.
RECOMENDATIQNS AND CONCLUSIONS: Overall, Mr. Northern has shown a great deal of
growth and maturing since his last evaluation in 1984. Part of this maturing may
be due to age, but an important aspect of his growth can be attributed to the social
interactions and interventions of adults, especially of the staff at the Duchesne
County Jail. He has been given more responsibility and respect than at any other
time of his life which, in turn, has led him to view himself as a responsible adult.
Mr. Northern shows no evidence of mental illness at this time. His major problem
is his capacity to deal with life's stresses without the use of illegal substances.
He fully realizes this shortcoming and wants to address drug issues as part of his
parole agreement.
Although Mr. Northern can be physically ai id verbally imposing, II • E> il :: e s i ic: 1: appeai to
have the capacity for violent acting out. He can be argumentative and assertive,
but responds to authority when necessary.
It is this writer's recomendation that Mr. Northern, if he is paroled, be placed in
a supportive environment such as family or friends to make transition to society as
uneventful as possible.
It is strongly recomended that, in addition to any mental
health treatment, f1 Northern receive drug abuse counseling.
FOR THE PURPOSES Of
AS A FAVORABLE ONE.

: BOARD OF PARDONS DETERMINATIONS, THIS REPORT IS TO BE REGARDED

E. Ted Brandhurst, Ph.D.
Associate Psychologist

AI Carlisle, Ph.
Chief Clinical Psychologist
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DEC - 7 W3U
R. PAUL V A N DAM (3312)
U T A H ATTORNEY GENERAL
C. Dane Nolan (4891)
Assistant A t t o r n e y General
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
6100 South 300 East Suite 403
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 265-5638
IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT I..AKI.: COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

K E N D A L L Q. NORTHERN,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff and Petitioner,
vs.
N . ELDON BARNES, WARDEN, UTAH
STATE PRISON A N D T H E DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS THROUGH T H E
BOARD OF PARDONS,

CASE N O . 900901925HC
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson)

Defendants and Respondents.
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12.

In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies

in effect which governed its actions and proceedings.

In May

1988 Board of Pardons Rule 3.10, in pertinent part, read as
follows:
310-1. Policy
The release or rehearing date established by the
Board of Pardons shall remain in effect upon written
referral indicating that the offender is in violation
of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison,
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any local,
state or federal government, or new evidence is
presented that an inmate, if released, would present a
serious risk or danger to the community.
310-2.

Procedure

Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing
date, information shall be provided to the Board
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing.
Upon receipt of such information, the offender will be
scheduled for a rescission hearing. Except under
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be
notified of all allegations and the date of the
scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance.
13.

On May 9, 1988 the Board of Pardons rescinded Mr.

Northern's May 10, 1988 parole release date.

Prior to that

rescission Northern was not notified of any allegations relating
to the rescission and no hearing occurred prior to the Board's
action on May 9, 1988.

In the document detailing the rescission

the Board made the following remark:

"Continue for another

psychological evaluation and complete prison progress report".
14.

The second psychological report was prepared on May 11,

5

1988, by Dr. Carlisle and his psychology intern# Gail Caldwell.
It considered the issue of how Mr. Northern's relationship with
his father might affect his success on parole and concluded that
while the demanding nature of his parents, especially his father,
might create stress for Northern, his goal was to depend on them
for emotional support for only a short time after being paroled.
The report recommended that Northern be paroled to Arizona so he
could be close to his parents, who were anxious and willing to
help him adjust to life outside of prison.
15.

On June 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a

hearing for July 8, 1988 to review Mr. Northern's status. Mr.
Northern received notification of that hearing by June 28, 1988.
16.
hearing.

On July 8, 1988, the Board of Pardons conducted the
At that hearing Mr. Northern was permitted to address

the Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and to
respond to questioning from the Board.
17.

At the conclusion of the hearing the Board of Pardons

affirmed the rescission of Mr. Northern's May 10, 1988 parole
release date based upon his "risk to society" and the need for
"appropriate punishment11, and rescheduled a rehearing for May,
1990.
18.

On October 9, 1988, Mr. Northern escaped from the

Duchesne County Jail.

On October 24, 1988, the Board of Pardons,
6

because of Mr. Northern's escape, rescinded Mr. Northern's May
1990 scheduled rehearing.
19.

Subsequently Mr. Northern was captured and returned to

the Utah State Prison.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Board of Pardons, in working within the indeterminate
sentencing scheme of the State of Utah, has the power to consider
the sentence imposed upon each criminal offender under its
jurisdiction and make that offender's sentence determinate.
The Courts should not interfere or review particular Board
of Pardons decisions lightly and should not reverse or set aside
such decisions unless the Board of Pardons has clearly violated a
constitutional right of the offender.
It is well established that an offender has no right to be
given a parole date by the Board of Pardons.

However, once a

parole date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the
Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim
of the Board members.
The question presented by this case is whether there is a
reasonable basis supporting the Board of Pardons' decision to
rescind Mr. Northern's May 10, 1988 parole date.

Board Rule 3.10

(text set forth above) provides the framework for answering this
7

question.

It states that the Board of Pardons may rescind an

offender's parole date if the Board receives a written referral
indicating that an offender has violated correctional institution
rules or the laws of any local, state, or federal government, or
new evidence is presented which shows that the offender, if
released, would present a serious risk or danger to the
community.
On May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons had received no written
referral from any source which suggested that Mr. Northern had
violated institutional rules.
inapplicable.

Thus, that portion of Rule 3.10 is

Additionally, the grant of parole had not been

rescinded upon its own terms because of any violation of
institutional rules.
Under the second alternative under Rule 3.10, this Court
defines "new evidence" as negative information received by the
Board of Pardons between the time that a parole release date is
set and the time that a rescission determination is made.

In

this case those dates are July 8, 1981 and May 9, 1988. This
Court defines "risk or danger to the community" to include the
situation where a person is likely to commit a crime.
After a careful analysis of the entire record in this case
and keeping in mind that this Court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the Board of Pardons, this Court's ruling is

8

that there was "new evidence" received by the Board of Pardons
which justified the Board's decision to rescind Mr. Northern's
May 10, 1988 parole date.

There was evidence regarding Mr.

Northern's drug use at the Utah State Prison and drug use at the
Duchesne County Jail.

Such drug use was illegal.

There was also

evidence which showed that Mr. Northern failed to show any
remorse for his victim or regarding the crimes he had committed
and that his behavior was, to some extent, anti-social.

This new

evidence indicated that, if released, Mr. Northern would present
a serious risk or danger to the community.
Also, the circumstances relating to Mr. Northern on May 9,
1990, constituted extraordinary circumstances under Rule 3.10
which justified the rescission of the parole date without
providing prior notice to Mr. Northern.
Additionally, a review of the entire record leads the Court
to conclude that the Board of Pardons did not rescind Mr.
Northern's parole release date because it believed he deserved to
be incarcerated for a longer period of time because of the nature
of his crime.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
For the reasons set forth above, the Board of Pardons did
not violate Mr. Northern's constitutional rights.
9

The petition

for a writ of habeas corpus is, therefore^ denied with prejudice.
DATED THIS

j_ DAY OF DECEMBER, £990.

UDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

/m
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ATTEST

JOTpAROL NESSET-SALE
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KENDALL Q. NORTHERN,
Plaintiff & Petitioner,
v.
N. ELDON BARNES, WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
THROUGH THE BOARD OF PARDONS

COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
ALTERNATIVELY A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS OR DECLARATORY
JUDGEMENT

Case No

mi mm R. mm

The Petitioner Kendall Q. Northern by and through his
attorney Jo Carol Nesset-Sale of Haley & Stolebarger hereby files
this petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus, and/or
Writ of Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment and complains that
for reasons set forth below he is illegally restrained of his
liberty by the Defendants:
Jurisdiction
1.

This action is made pursuant to Rule 65B(b)(2,4) and (f)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Article I, Sections 5, 7,
9, 8, 11, and 18 of the Utah Constitution, the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States,
Sec. 78-33-1 et seq. (Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended), and Sec.
78-12-25(1), (Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended).

VENUE
2.

Venue is properly in the Third Judicial District Court

as Petitioner/Plaintiff (hereinafter "Petitioner") is
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison and the acts complained of
by the Board of Pardons occurred in Salt Lake County; in addition
the damage as a result of Defendant's breach of contract exceeds
$10,000.

No other complaint for this relief has been considered

by another court or is pending in another court.
3.

On July 28, 1980, Petitioner, then aged eighteen, was

committed to the Utah State Prison for the following terms, based
upon Petitioner's pleas of guilty to the following offenses:
Second Degree Murder - five year to life, and Aggravated Robbery
- five years to life, the terms to run consecutively.
4.

On July 8, 1981, Petitioner appeared before the Board of

Pardons of the State of Utah and was given a parole date of May
10, 1988.
5.

In January 1986 Petitioner requested a transfer to a

county jail, given his protective status at the Utah State
Prison, and was recommended by his Unit Management Team for
transfer, the team noting that Petitioner had not been a
management problem.
6.

He was denied transfer on January 23, 1986.

In March 1986 the Unit Management team again recommended

his transfer, with a specific recommendation of the Duchesne
County Jail.

On March 27, 1986, Petitioner was transferred to

the Duchesne County Jail.
7.

Petitioner acquitted himself well at the Duchesne County

Jail, earning trustee status that permitted him to be on

assignments outside of the jail facility, and in March, April,
and early May of 1988 provided valuable assistance in setting up
a photography lab for Lt. Ralph Stansfield.
8.

The inmate report on Petitioner submitted to the Utah

State Prison by the Duchesne County Jail Commander for March and
April 1988 noted Petitioner's "excellent job" on the photography
lab, that he "gets along well with others", and his anxious
anticipation of his May 10, 1988, release date.
9.

On March 29, 1988, Petitioner's Social Service Worker

recommended Early Release, with Petitioner requiring no special
parole conditions and having no special problems.
10.

On April 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons, through its

Hearing Officer Paul Larsen, reviewed a written statement of
Petitioner in which he requested parole to Arizona, his home
state, where his parents and employment awaited him, and made an
Interim Decision that added to Petitioner's general terms and
conditions of parole the following special conditions:
a)

that he complete Intensive Supervision Parole ("ISP")
if available in Utah;

b)

that the following additional special conditions of
supervision be added in the receiving state (if he were
paroled out of Utah)
1*

random urinalysis;

2.

complete mental health therapy;

3#

maintain full-time employment or have full-time
student status;

4.

maintain nighttime (7:00 p.m.) curfew for the

first six months.
11.

On May 9, 1988, without notice to Petitioner and

without giving him an opportunity to be present or be heard; and
without the convening of a hearing; and without a record having
been made; the Board of Pardons rescinded by minute entry
Petitioner's parole date that was to have become effective the
following day.
12.

On July 8, 1988# the Board of Pardons conducted a

Special Attention hearing.

Petitioner, who requested and was

denied permission to have counsel, was present and made a
statement.

The Board affirmed its rescission of his May 10

parole date, based upon Petitioner's risk to society and the
members' concern that Petitioner's punishment by appropriate for
his crime.
13.

He was given a May 10, 1990, rehearing date.

On October 9, 1988, Petitioner left the Duchesne County

Jail without permission.

He was captured in Canada and returned

to Utah on or about October 6, 1989.
First Cause of Action
14.

The Utah Board of Pardons violated its written policies

and procedures when on May 9, 1988, it rescinded Petitioner's
parole date of May 10, 1988; to wit:
a.

The Board's written policy 3.10, dated July 14, 1986,
part of the Utah Administrative Code, mandated that an
inmate's release date established by the Board of
Pardons shall remain in effect unless: 1) the Board
receives a written referral of the inmate's violation
of prison regulations or criminal laws or 2) the Board
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Petitioner further prays that the " >urt schedule a hearing
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claims as sooi :i as the matter
DATED this

be heard.

j[jftj^xday CJj larch, 1990.

CERTTF TCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^&
day of March 1990 a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint and Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus and Alternatively a Writ of Mandamus or
Declaratory Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid to the
following:
Dane
• Utah
6100
Salt

Olsen
S t a t e Board of Pirrrion -;
South 300 East
Lake City, Utah 84117
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ORDER O F PAROLE
IN TIE MATTER O F THE APPLICATION OF liQEIHEKWi KENDALL QVTHW
UTAH STATE PRISON NO- 15QG2
application for'parole, termination, of sentence, ox expiration of sentence
tving come oefore the Utah State Board of Pardons in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 9th
IJ of July, 19911 ^ J the applicant-appearing in person or having waived, in writing the ri gl it
> appearan »t and Mir» Board having heard the case, issues the following order:

m t e n c e 'heretofore imposed upon him/hex: b y a judge of the Third Judicial District Court in
id for the County of Salt Mice for the crime(s) of MURDER II, 1st degree felony. Expiration
IFE; AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 3 st d I j; " ee fel ony E stpi rat lor 1 IFE; ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY, 2nd degree
elony, Expiration 07/19/06 >
The parole shall i l; "become
z*u day Qt wuiy, lys«. Hif applicant
grees to the conditions of parole and evidences k agreement b y signing the parole
Lgreemant* The parole agreement o r contract shall b e administered, b y duly authorised agar. ts
»f the-Utah State Department of Corrections for the Utah State Board o f I w c t t m .
v
It is further ordered :". ' **" *:'* '' *"1""k
*u* ^ n v * caused applicant shai i
•£ a n y infractions of the rules - regulations
- atw Prison or shall
refuse to perform duties a s .assigned b y the Utah State Prison o r i§ found 1 bt
>f any other law of the State o f Utah prior to the effective date of said parole,
)rder of Parole is revoked and'becomes null an d >» o:i d

\w gviitj
I si I cini
<>. i I - - n
then this

Dated this 9th Day of July, 1 9 9 1 .
B y Order o f the Board of Pardons of: the Stat"

* «. •, : , j im K f t|,!; i :: ».tin < jnj

of July, 1991,

reduced its decision i n this m a t t e r to writing ant' 'MM ©by affix my signature as Chairman fc r
and oa„ behalf of the state of Utah, Board of Pardons-

03/02-Pf

IDC PAROLE REG 3

FAI 801 532 6124

IS, 003

Memoers
Donald E^BUnchand
Michael It Slbbett

•tenmn H. Bmgtrter
Gtovtmor
HJL(tae)Hiun

WttUamL Peters

Chairman

Hatter N. Coda

D t p Q r i t i'nc B u A t t u ut PARDONS Or i nc S'TATE ll I ""I I I i U! I
PAROLE AGREEttHKI
NORTHERN, KENDALL QU'jKN, agree to be directed end supervised by Agents ot the Utah State
artment of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to TJtah State
rectious, according to this Agreement
urther agree to ubidc by all conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement mi any
itional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, consistent with the
s of the State of Utah, I fully understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any
ditions thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing
parole to be revoked or my parole period to start over*
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE
'On the day of my release from the institution or confinement! I will
W5UEASE:
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing.
I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at such residence
BESIDEHCE:
ia fact and on record and shall not change my place of residence without
prior knowledge of my Parole Agent. I snail not leave the State of Utah
without prior written authorisation from my Parole Agent. It is hereby
acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written
authorisation from my Parole Agentt that I hereby waive extradition from anj
state in which I may be found, to the State of Utah.
I shall obey a 1 1 State and Federal 1 aws and municipal ordinances at all
comfljoc:
times.
I shall make written or in person reports to my Parole Agent by the fifth
REPORT:
of each and every month or as directed and I shall permit visits to my place
of residence as required by my Parole Agent for the purpose of insuring
compliance with the conditions of parole.
BSE IOXHEHI ! I will seek and maintain full-time employment unless X am pax.
an educational or therapy program approved by my Parole Agent.
I agree to allow a Parole Agent to search my personf residence, vehicle,
SEARCH:
or any other property under my control» without a warrant, any time day or
night, upon reasonable suspicion as ascertained by a Parole Agent, to insure
compliance with the conditions of my parole.
I shall not own, possess, or have under my control any explosives,
WEAPONS:
firearms, or any dangerous weapons as defined in Utah Code Annotated,
Section 76-10-501, as tended.
ASSOCIATION I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can
reasonably be eacpected to result in. or which has resulted in criminal Or
illegal activity*
SPECIAL OUNDlTlONSs I shall:
1 Submit to random drug testing* 2 Successful^
3 Successfully complete Mental Health Therapy.
4 Successfully complete ISP if avail where residing*
5 Successfully complete CCC -unless accepted for compact supervision.
6 Pay restitution of 526,350.00 on case # CR80-26*.

ave read, understand and agree to the above
opy of t h i s Agreement.
^
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PER CURIAM:
This case is before the court on raspondents' motion for a
stay pending appeal of an order granting a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and ordering the release of petitioner Robert D.
Preece forthwith. In addition to opposing the stay, petitioner
has moved this court for summary disposition of the appeal, in
the interest of expediting a decision in this case, we deem it
appropriate to address the merits of the appeal at this time.
sje Rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse the
order of the district court, in part, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.
The complaint filed by petitioner in the district court
challenged the determination of hie parole date by the Board of
Pardons! The order of the trial court recites that the Board
applied an internal guideline of 147 months in determining
petitioner's release date of October 10, 1994. ™ « g ? ™ f „ M .
subsequently learned that the actual guideline *©***• ° ™ * ? *
was 111 months. Under that guideline. Petitioner would have been
entitled to release on parole on October 10, 1991.0 The district
court continued proceedings on the petition to J^ * * * ? J ° f *
"to correct the error or explain their reasons for deviating from

the guidelines." The Board held a special attention hearing and
reaffirmed the release date at 147 months for October 10, 1994,
without providing any written explanation for its decision, as
required by its own internal rules. £ n R671-305-2, Utah
Administrative Code (1992).
Based upon the preceding facts, the trial court granted the
petition and ordered petitioner's release "forthwith," stating:
This court finds that under the circumstance
of the error made as to the guidelines
discussed with Petitioner that the Petitioner
is entitled to an explanation of the error
which the Board refuses to do. Further, due
process requires fair process and a
Petitioner is entitled to an explanation of
why the error should be ignored and the
longer term served. It is cruel and unusual
punishment to do otherwise. The Petitioner
has been denied due process and is being
treated to cruel and unusual punishment when
no correction or explanation is given as to
the mistake and as to the time to be served
by the Petitioner.
Respondents contend that the trial court exceeded its
authority in ordering the release of the petitioner as a remedy
for the due process violation found by the court, and that the
court should have proceeded in accordance with Rule 65B(e), Utah
Rules of civil Procedure. Rule 65B(e)(2)(B) provides that relief
may be granted "where an inferior court, administrative agency,
corporation or person has failed to perform an act required by
law as a duty of office, trust or station." Respondents,
accordingly, contend that the petition is not a proper petition
for "wrongful imprisonment" under Rule €5B(b) because it is not a
challenge to the validity of the original commitment, and because
petitioner is serving a valid sentence that has not been set
aside on by any court on appeal or otherwise.
Although we agree that the petitioner was entitled to a
written explanation of the parole determination following the
special attention hearing, we hold that the district court
exceeded its authority in ordering the unconditional release of
petitioner based upon the failure of the Board to comply with the
prior orders of the court and its own procedural rules. Under
our indeterminate sentencing system, the authority to determine
parole dates is vested in the Board of Pardons. &&s Foota v,

Board of Pardons. 808 F.2d 734 (Utah 1991). While parole
decisions are subject to habeas corpus review under Foote. this
court has previously held that the scope of review is limited to

S9n79A-rA

*

a review of procedural due process and does not extend authority
for judicial review of the "reasonableness of the parole
decision", which is not subject to judicial review under Utah
code Ann. S 77-27-5(3) (SUpp. 1992). Horthern, v, Barnes, 825 P.2d
696, 699 (Utah App. 1992). We conclude that the appropriate
remedy for the procedural due process violation found by the
district court in this case is to require the Board expeditiously
to provide the district court and petitioner with a written
explanation of its reasons for the parole decision. £££ also.
R671-305-2, Utah Administrative Code (1992). To the extent that
the district court's ruling is based upon a determination that
the Board's guidelines are mandatory, that conclusion is an
incorrect statement of the law under Stat* V. Hall, 806 P.2d 217,
218 (Utah App. 1991).
The order of the district court is reversed insofar as it
provides for unconditional release of petitioner from the custody
of the Department of corrections. The case is remanded to the
district court with instructions to treat the petition under Rule
6SB(e).
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Continue for another psychological evaluation and conv>lete prison
REMARffij.^ r~,r~+
~
crima

L Criminal Homicide
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It is further ordered that in the event the above named shall be found guilty of any infraction of rules and regulations of the Utah State
Prison, any community corrections center or other residential facility, or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned or is found
in violation of any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of this decision, the order may be made null and void.
flay *,• i9£o
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date
"'
198
affixed my
signature as Administrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

Paul W. Sheffield, Administrator
An appRcatbn for redeterminatbn may be made after one year from the Board's
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION

NAME: Kendall Quin Northern
DIAGNOSTIC NUMBER: 1768P
AGE: 18
OFFENSE: Aggravated Robbery (Criminal Homicide reportedly dropped)
DIAGNOSTIC AGENT: Larry Hafeli
COUNSELOR: Protective Custody, Utah State Prison
DATE RECEIVED: 4/24/80
INTERVIEWED: 6/13/80 (Utah State Prison)
REPORT WRITTEN: 6/16/80
DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS: Doppelt Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Bender
Gestalt, Rorschach, Sentence Completion Form, Clinical Interview
Ken Northern was not able to take our standard battery of tests because of his
placement on Protection in the prison, but all available information indicates
he commands above average intelligence and good literacy skills. Administration
of a short-form WAIS yielded an I.Q. estimate of 128 in the Superior range, and
Bender productions offered no indications of any organic impairment. Nothing
in these test results or the interview situation suggested formal thought disorder,
and Mr. Northern was well oriented in all three spheres. This data agrees generally
with an earlier evaluation by Marcel C. Chappuis, with my somewhat higher obtained
I.Q. being partially the result of a practice effect and perhaps partially the
result of my using a shorter version of the test. In any case, we can confidently
state that Mr. Northern is a bright young man in full control of his mental faculties
I have no actual police arrest record available, but Mr. Northern reports only
one prior arrest as a juvenile and no history whatsoever of drug or alcohol abuse.
There is no available information to suggest that either alcohol or drugs played
a part in the current crime, although I am curious what the two co-defendants were
actually doing during the time they were "just riding around" prior to the commissioi
of this offense,
A current MMPI is not available, but assuming the accuracy of the earlier reported
4-6 elevation, this would not be a typical or classic antisocial personality so
much as an individual deeply-involved in latent and very personal hostility.
Rorschach responses corroberated the impression of paranoid-type ideation essentiall
supporting a highly explosive inner rage. Mr. Northern maintains that he did not
shoot the victim and had no knowledge of any intent to shoot, yet this personality
is such that an erruption of pent-up aggressive rage would be fully consistent.
The Rorschach did not Indicate any basically oppositional or antisocial features
per se, but did suggest considerable internal distress with the father-figure —
which could certainly result in antisocial acting-out behaviors. Nothing could be
elecited to explain this dynamic beyond Mr. Northern's saying he used to feel contempt for his businessman father's staid and conventional ways, but that now he
feels very different and is thankful for parental support. I suspect that some
problems between father and son extend far back into childhood, and wish we had
more information on the history of this family.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION
Kendall Quin Northern
Page -2Testing conditions on the Protection Unit did not allow as extensive an
evaluation as we would have wished, yet there is enough information to
indicate serious causes for distress. Perhaps the most alarming aspect
of our interview was that not once did Mr. Norther ever express any concern
over the death of the victim — only exasperation over the "dumb" nature of
the robbery, and considerable frustration that his agreeing to testify has not
resulted in a "better deal" for himself. This in itself is diagnostic, since
a good psychopath at this intellectual level would easily and automatically
feign the expected remorse.
Mr. Northern is obviously not able to cope with the rigors of the Utah State
Prison environment, yet he is a danger to society. He really belongs in the
Public Offenders Program at Provo. If they refuse to accept him, however,
incarceration may have to be considered with hopes that he can eventually
be worked into the Youthful Offenders Program at the prison.
Diagnostic Impression: Superior intelligence; no evidence of organicity,
psychosis or substance abuse; Paranoid-type Personality with highly explosive
latent rage and antisocial acting-out features.

CAROL S. BACHSTETTER, M.A.
Clinical Psychologist
CSB:js
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90-DAY DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION
STATT Or IJTMI
DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS
D a t F I l e T e r r e J r ^ A p r i l 2 4 , 1980
JUDGE EWFST F. EUPMN
SALT LAKE CITY
(CITY)

Date Hue: J u l y J a , l i ^ o
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE
(CCJUMY)

UTAH

NAME: NORTHERN, Kendall Quinn (Age 18) COURT CASE NO.: CR80-264
PROSECUTOR: Michael Christensen
OFFENSE: Aggravated Robbery, Felony I
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Rriert Van Sciver
Criminal Homicide, *lirder in
the 2nd Degree, Felony I

IDEMIFICATION OF PROBLEM AREAS:

I. Kendall Northern has pleaded guilty to two violent offenses,
Aggravated Robbery and Criminal Homicide. According to the Salt
Lake City Police Department, the defendant along with Robert Alan
Phillips robbed and murdered Everett Hamby, Jr., a taxi driver.
Evidence indicates that it was theflggeflfl&nt,Kendall '^crtnern,
who purchased the gun used by Mr. B u m p s as well as a gun ri?
carried during, conmission oi the KODDery. lhe defendant pnrrTS^ftd
these weanons uith a forged check. MUUlUUally. according to the
Probable Cause Statement included in the Complaint, "Both suspects
admitted that Phillips was holding the 'RG .357 Magnum1 pistol
when Hampy was shot first in the head by Phillips/and then at
NdTThefft's alleged insistence. Phillips snot iianpy a second and
third time tflfflSkeSbire he was dead.
'"
II. According to the records of the Second District Juvenile Court in
Salt Lake City, the defendant ha* a prior juvenile arrest record
in Maricopa County. Arizona. At the time he was arresteM! in reference
to the present charge, the defendant was wanted in Arizona in reference
to Charges of Receiving Stolen Pppnftri;v

Rnrolarv. and Theft 0^ a * " *

Vehicle. Additionally, the defendant had prior arrests as a juvenile
for nrooation VIA]atinn p p t t T Y W t . an<i inert ot a vehicle.
III. Mr. Northern was also charged with 13 Counts of Forgery according
to the records of the Utah Bureau ot criminal mveitlgfltlflft. It" is
this agent's understanding that there was an agreement not to
pTbsecute in reterence 16 thfi^e1 LJiUluy^" 5^' 7^5TTflf3 TH^V&greenent
jji the present case.
~
IV. According to a psychological evaluation prepared by the staff
psychologist at the Diagnostic Unit, the defendant was characterized
as a "paranoid-type personality with highly explosive latent rage
a?3 antisocial ULLUl^uui fcamies." Hlfther testing suggested
"considerable internal distress with the father figure which could
certainly result in antisocial acting-out behaviors." According to
a psychological evaluation prepared by Mr. Marcel Chappuis for the
Juvenile Court, "It appears that Ken is functioning in the top
ten percentile intellectually with speciiic strengths in tne""5Teas
ol comprehension and problem rearming-" According to Mr. ureck LeBeqne. M.n. . and rlirpfcfnf of Forensic P^vrniatrir Services at the
HrnvAr^ry rsf TItaK| *h+ ^ofan^awt i c OTN oTM-^fyiaJ p e r s o n a l i t y and

is basically untreatable. However, some individuals are treatable

90-DAY DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION
NORTHERN, Kendall Quinn
July 28, 1980
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IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM AREAS:

(Continued)

and "this is possible only if they are held in custody in an
extremely controlled and structured environment for a great manv
years, and may be accomplished only by an arduous process of
restructuring the antisocial-criminal personality into a personality.'
more socially acceptable."
V. Possessing a tenth grade education, the records of the Second District
Juvenile Court reflect rhat the defenrjar^ wag a h»hflinnroi pjnNfT *"

early as elementary school. The defendant began having serious
behavioral problems at age 14 and dropped out of high school in the
tentn grade. An attempt was then made to send the defendant to a
parochial school; however, that failed. Mr. Northern hag w n r ^
periodically and there were some short perils nf enpinvw<m» U H » K
his parents, it 15 Important to note that the defendant came to Salt
LaKe tity while in the employ of a moving firm, and established a
residence in Salt Lake City utilizing an alias of Edward C. Duffany.
The defendant did assume employment under the name of Mr. Duffany.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT:
On April 24, 1980 Kendall Quinn Northern pleaded cnnltv to a charge of
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, and Criminal HomiciHeA^rHer •>,
al.cn a First Degree HelonV-

The defendant Ait

a?TR* tn testify against the

co-defendant in this case, Robert Alan Phillips. The defendant was reterred
for a b>u-Uav Evaluation on April Z4. 198Q without benefit of a Presentence
Investigation Report; therefore, the following information is submitted for
the Court's consideration.
INFORMATION:
COUNT I
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1980, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the said Kendall Ouin Northern
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Everett Hamby,
or acting with the mental state required for the commission
of said offense, solicited, requested.commanded, encouraged,
or intentionally afgeld Robert Alan Phillips to cauhie IbV. '
deafh ot Everett namoy, Jr. while the defendant was engaged in
llftf lUllllli^i6n 8*fll'UJ1 ULlfellipi IU LUHlllt. or Hicht MEfeT" '•
comTTTTTMfig or attempting to commit Aggravated Robbery;
COUNT II
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1980, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said Kendall Quin
Northern unlawfully and intentionally took personal
property in the pogsessioif of Everett Hamby Jr. lit or
near ilbb West yuu south, from the ^ei^iriflfimmediate
presence of Everett Hamby Jr., against M s w i n ,frythe
use of force or fear^ and ^ {he commission of same did
use a firearm:.
NOTE: As was previously indicated, the defendant was also arrested for
a number of counts of Forgery. As part of a plea agreement arrangement, the defendant will not be charged in reference to those
Forgery counts.
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OFTENSE:
A. OFFICIAL VERSION:
According to the records of the Salt Lake County Attorney's office
as well as the Salt Lake City Police Department, Detective Carl Voyles
was assigned to the criminal homicide investigation in reference to
Everett Hamby, Jr. Mr. Hamby's body was found on January 1, 1980 at
9:30 p.m. at 2^00 West 900 South in Salt Lake County. He was employed
as a cab driver for City Cab Company. The body was found to contain
three bullet holes and Mr. Hamby was pronounced dead at the scene.
According to an autopsy, the cause of death was three gunshot wounds
any one of which would have caused death. One of the bullets found
in the chest cavity was a .38 or .357 caliber. Further evidence
indicated that barrel markings on the bullet were consistent with
those of a barrel configuration found in the pistol production of an
RG, Model 57, caliber .357.
Records further indicate that on January 9, 1980, while serving a
Felony arrest warrant on Edward C. Duffany for Bad Checks, Officers
made contact with Kendall Quinn Northern, the defendant. It was
determined that Mr. Northern had been using the alias of Edward
Duffany to pass bad checks. On December 23, 1979, the defendant,
using the name of Duffany, had purchased an RG, Model 57 .357 Magnum
pistol matching the description of the possible murder weapon,
fir. Northern was identified as passing that check to Gibson's by
store employees.
Mr. Northern was advised of his rights per Miranda and stated that
he was present on January 1, 1980 and observed the Robbery and shooting
of fir. Hamby. The defendant named Robert Alan Phillips, his roommate,
as the individual responsible.
Salt Lake officers then went to American Auto Parts in South Salt
Lake and arrested Mr. Phillips. Both suspects admitted and confessed
to their respective involvement in the homicide of Mr. Hamby and both
admitted that they intended to rob Hamby and, in fact, took $26 before
Hamby was shot. f,Both suspects admitted that Phillips was holding
the fRG .357 Magnum1 pistol when Hamby was shot first in the head by
Phillies, and then at Northern's alleged insistence, Phillips shot
Hamby a second and third time to make sure he was dead." After the
shooting both suspects took Mr. Hamby's cab and money and drove to
Trolley Square where they were observed abandoning the cab.
Subsequent search of the residence at 837 South 400 East, Apartment 1-B, belonging to the defendant and Mr. Phillips, disclosed a
Rohm .357 pistol that Phillips and Northern stated Northern had used
to force the cab driver Hamby from his cab for purposes of taking his
money and cab.
CO-DEFENDAMPS DISPOSITION: (Please refer to attached.)
B.

DEFENDANT'S STATBtENT;
When interviewed for purposes of this 90-Day Diagnostic Evaluation
and questioned regarding his involvement in this offense, Mr. Northern
steadfastly maintained that he was not responsible for the nurder or
robbery ot Mr. Hampy on January 1. lSJifln The defendant gflnvincineiv
sfgfed tnat ne did not Know My. WnirTps was gninp to rob rhP victim
nor snoot nun, he further claimed that he could not prevent Mr. Phillips
irm conmitting these offenses as Phillips turned the pun toward him and
warned him to allegedly h?^ v nff. Aft»r th» mmmiccirm nf the offense
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OFFENSE:
B. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT: (Continued)
Mr. Vnrthpm Q|ptPC that ^ wn< "-jr, shock" and attempted to contact
the police; however. Mr. Phillips kent him n "prisoner" m their
apartment. Mr. Northern further maintains that he was attempting
to contact the nolice hit hefore, he rouiq ao 50. was arrestee.
It is interesting to note tViflt **WflC a r T a r f i n T rr> f Mf agent that
Mrf Northerr] expressed nn remorse, for what hanpened-tD—iae-53S5m
in t h i s Case.

The OnlV emnpor> t h P HefenHant Qeene,! t n n n r t r p v

wag that of outrage tor a legal system which apparently hp fppig
had promised him a placement m the California Youth Authority
with the actual result of his being plflcffl af Thf> ]]f»h st. ir TPrison
for a 90-Day Evaluation.Mr. Northern explained to this agent that
he was testifying against Mr. Phillips and had, in fact, acted as
a witness for the State at the preliminary hearing.
C. INVESTIGATIVE OFFICER'S STATB1ENT:
Contact was made with Detective Carl Voyles of the Salt Lake City
Police Department. Detective Vovie* maintained that it was Mr. Norther
who, in fact, initiated thy Robbery. "He pulled a run first and both
he and Phillies were armed," The detective maintained that it was
Mr. Northern who initiated the s i t u a t e which ultimately rpcnireri ^n
Mr. Hamby's death. When arrested, it; became annarent to th» A * t e r t i ^ »
that Mr. Northern was cunning and very intelligent comparedjto
Mr. frhiiiip* who was rather slow. "1 teei that korthem dominated
Phillips. Also, Mrs. Hamby is a widow now with seven children."
The detective pointed out that it was Mr. Northern who purchased
the murder weapon with a forged check and also nnrchnsed a 9 mm
pistol which was on his person at fhe tipe he was flrrepfej. That
particular gun was purchased at Guns Unlimited, Salt Lake City.
"He is a macho kid who is most unpredictable. As a matter of fact.
he^was rearw to leave the area and we arrested him just before he
got away."
D. VICTIM'S STATBen':
Contact was made with Mrs. Everett Hamby, Jr., widow of the deceased.
Mrs. Hamby indicated that she has no vengeful feelings against the
defendants but feels that a prison conmitment is appropriate,
mostly, because Mrs. Hamby indicated that both individuals could do
further harm in the community if they were released. Presently she
is the sole support of her seven children, however, is receiving
some money from social security and workmen's compensation. To
supplement that income, however, Mrs. Hamby must take in other
children for day care.
Mrs. Hamby stated that Mr. Phillips has written her a letter
indicating that he is sorry for what has happened. She thought that
was significant, but chose not to reply to Mr. Phillips' letter, as
Mrs. Hamby described receiving that letter was "rubbing salt in the
wounds."
PRIOR RECORD:
A#

JUVENILE: The following information was secured- from the records
of the Second District Juvenile Court and the records of Maricopa
County, Arizona,
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PRIOR RECORD:
A. JUVKItE:

(Continued)
DISPOSITION

CHARGE

UATE

5/3rs

Theft of a Vehicle

Probation

6/19/78

Petty Theft

Nonjudicial handlinp

8/19/79

PictiiU011 ^^ttlatis*1

Nonjudicial handlinp

8/31/79

Jobation Violation

Nonjudicial handling

8/29/79

Theft of a Vehicle

Pending "7

9/12/79

Burglary

Pending S

8/7/79

RATPiv^p S+M»n PrnpArrv

Pending )

^If1

'

According to the records of the Second District Juvenile Court,
Mr. Northern was first arrested in May of 1978 for Theft of a
Vehicle. That involved a neighbor's dunebuggy. A Bench Warrant
was subsequently issued because the defendant failed to report
regularly to his probation officer and, in fact, violated the terms
of his probation by getting arrested on June 19, 1978 for Petty
Theft, when he attempted to switch price tags in a store. Further,
on August 31, 1979, the defendant left the State of Arizona without
permission. On August 29, 1979 the defendant was charged with Theft
of a Vehicle wherein he took his parents' van and was subsequently
arrested in Houston, Texas. The defendant was also charged with
Burglary on 9/12/79 when he burglarized his parents1 home. Also in
AugUSt Of 1979 t h e faff*™**** uac a r r . c t ^ fnT T O T » i v i n p c t n l PTI prnpprrv

and that matter is pending. According to the defendant's Juvenile
Court probation officer in Arizona, probation was unsuccessful as the
defendant was resistant to counseling and to change.
B. ADULT:
The following information was secured from the records of the Utah
Bureau of Criminal Identification:
AGENCY
S.O. SLCo.

DATE
1/10/80

CHARGE
Murder and Robber/

18 counts Forgery. Fel. Ill

DISPOSITION
Present offense; DO Da<
Diag. Eval. ordered
4/24/80
Prosecution declined
as result or m e a

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
Kendall Quinn Northern was born May 5, 1962, the youngest of four children
born to Don and Clair Northern. The defendant's parents were Dotn irom
Southern Utah and married in 1950, The defendant was born in Kaysville,
Utah where his father was a high school teacher. When Kendall was approximate
four, the family ^relocated tfl ScWEfteffl California where Mr. Northern took a ic
with Litton Corporation. In 1972, when Kendall was ten? the defendant's parer
became selt-emfllflygg'Tand moved to Arizona. The family is LPS (Monnonj and
according to some reports, is a very cohesive family. However, Kendall her;an
having personal problems at an early a?f> and hprnrnft a behavioral problem in
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BACKGROUND INTORmTION:

(Continued)

grade school, "»- Hi^p^y^d hiis parents and described himself as heinq_ a
"pansv" by being pushed around by other children.
The defendant began acting-out shortly after the family moved to Phoenix,
Arizona and there appeared to be some family instability according to the
records of the Second District Juvenile Court in Salt Lake City. According to the records o^ the Maricopa County Probation Department for Juvenile
Offenders, the defendant's family had a difficult T im* in 1Q7Q wit^ frm^ii
In February ot 1979. Mrs. Northern contacted the probation officer because
she feared Kendall would h^rnm* vinipnt. He was counseled and apparently
t h e r e was 3 jHff»T»nr» r>f r>pirnrm

ac t n W W P KPnna U snould WorT

It*

was the probation officer's opinion that both the parents and Kendall were
placing him in the middle. In July of 1979, according to the parents,
Kendall left the state and bounced several checks on H * P ^ ]flyeras well
as stealing some tools and cash. Vhe probation officer made a corrcnent.
"I feel that Kendall and his parents have no regard for the Court or probation."
For a period of approximately four years, Kendall Northern was treated by
Doctor Scoresby, a counseling psychologist. Doctor Scoresbv classified
the defendant as a "con artist.11
At an early age, th»ri»f»ndan»w g W a *T\A*pm*+*t a ^ i*f+ hnm* ^ y f »
16 and Joined a local magazine crew. The defendant traveled a great deal
between California, Arizona, and Florida.
The defendant dropped out of the tenth erade at Corona del Sol School in
Tempe, Arizona. He had been involved in sports but failed to follow
through. The defendant was then placed in the parochial school by his
parents as they felt he needed the controls. However, the defendant
shortly thereafter became involved in further problems with the Juvenile
Court and quit school again. According to a Juvenile Court report, the
parents "expressed their concern that Kendall's mature ffj-y, ^jfli \—±—
no control over, and his exceptional social skill, w h ^ h *h*v r^infnrrod
as a family standard, Would be used lift]UStly against their son." The
detenoant was iaoeiea eariy as being WTft Abnoxious and a tfflllBlemaker
in school. According to one report from the Detention Center at the Second
District Juvenile Court in Salt Lake City, the defendant lost his temper to
the point that they thought he would become assaultive. The defendant has
a tendency to exaggerate and in the past, the defendant's father has attempte
to intercede in the Court process and both parents tend to minimize the
defendant's problems.
MARITAL HISTORY;
The defendant ]* ciwyig
EDUCATION:
Kendall Northern attended elementary schools both in Southern California
and in the state of Arizona. He was last enrolled in a parochial school
in Tempe after dropping out of Corona del Sol High School while in the
tenth grade. Records of the Second District Juvenile Court indicate that
the defendant was a behavioral problem while in school. He did get
involved in sports while in high school, however, did not follow through
with the regime. According to the attached Psychological Evaluation, the
defendant is intellectually in the Superior range. Since housed at the
Utah State Prison, the defendant has expressed what appears to be a sincere
desire to receive his GED and ultimately to take college courses.
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HEALTH:
A. PHYSICAL: The defendant is in good physical health and underwent
a complete medical examination at the Utah State Prison. Having
suffered from the usual childhood diseases, the defendant has no
significant impairments.
B. MENT.U AND BtOTIONAL: (Please refer to the attached Psychological
Evaluation completed by the Division of Corrections as well as the
Psychological Evaluation and Psychiatric Evaluation completed by
the Second District Juvenile Court.)
ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE:
A. ALCOHOL: The defendant acknowledges he is a ^ j ? ] rlrinVpr- however,
he has no prior a r r e ^ ***- aTmh.ii.-po^tpH offenses. Alcohol did
not apparently play a part in the present offense.
B. DRUGS: Again, the defendant h?* forf "H flmp-r»iat»d arrpcrc and
it""3oes not appear tr^t fo ha^ * C 1 'c n i ^ r a n t pyphlem in this area
either.
B-ffLOYMEOT HISTORY:
Mr. Northern's employment record is sporadic. At the time of his arrest
for the present offense he was working at Ute Cab Company and previous
to that had WSr7frd At L1MLU in b^lt Lake y t v tor approximately one and
ajialg IHUhlh!>.

Pfior to that, he worked for varimis moving and <itOraff

ccHMfllfiB.."As is indicated in the file material of the Second District
Juvenile Court, the defendant did work for a period of time for his parents
as a salesman.
MILITARY: The defendant has never been in the military.
COLLATERAL CONTACTS:
A collateral contact was made with Mr. Don Northern and Mrs. Clair Northern,
the defendant's parents, at 11815 South Maze Court. Phoenix, Arizona. Both
Mr. and Mrs. Northern met with this agent in Salt Lake City. They indicated
that they are very concerned over their son's current situation and feel
that he was threatened by the co-defendant to get involved in the present
offense. Mr. Northern indicated that he has had some problems with his son
in the past but they have not been of a serious nature. Specifically,
Mr. Northern told this agent about the defendant's arrest for stealing a
neighbor's dunebuggy and a subsequent arrest in Houston, Texas when the
defendant had the family van. Mr, Northern indicated that at that time he
decided to leave Kendall in jail to deal with the situation on his own.
Mrs. Northern indicated that Kendall has always been a very large person and
has been ridiculed by his peers. Mrs. Northern further stated that her son
is a "good boy" and has been dealt with unfairly in his present Court matter.
Mrs. Northern indicated that she feels her son should be placed in a program
for youthful offenders so he could hopefully pursue his education.
Mr. and Mrs. Northern were upset to learn that their son had pleaded guilty
to two First Degree Felonies. It was their impression that there was only
one charge involved.
A collateral contact was made by letter with Jean Cotter, the defendant's
sister residing in Tempe, Arizona. The letter indicates that the defendant
had pretty much a normal upbringing and was a very bright individual.
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COLLATERAL CONTACTS:

(Continued)

The defendant was also characterized as being very enterprising. It was
his sister's belief that "Kenny just happened to be with the wrong person
at the wrong time. You see, Kenny has always been big for his age and
extremely overweight and so he has been constantly ridiculed and teased
by other kids his age his whole life. Kenny felt he had no other choice
but to be friends with the only kids that would accept him and unfortunately
Bob was one of those friends." There was an indication in the letter that
the defendant was not accepted completely by the family. "No one ever in
Kenny's life has treated him with worth except on occasion his family, and
I'm sad to say that that wasn't very often."
A collateral contact was made with Karen Fleming, the defendant's sister
who resides in Mesa, Arizona. According to Mrs .Fleming, the defendant
and his brother and sisters were raised by a very fine mother and father.
The defendant and his family were very active in sports and picnicking
and the defendant's sister indicated that because of his size, he has always
had problems. Mrs. Fleming feels that her brother has attempted to get
attention from the family and others by sometimes outrageous behavior. "He
is full of love and has a heart big enough for three people and most
important, does not belong in a prison. He is a kind person and I've heard
it said that in prison they take kindness for weakness."
A collateral contact was made with Amy Black, the defendant's grandmother
in Mesa, Arizona. Mrs. Black indicated that the detendant has always been
a kind-hearted boy. "Ken comes from such a fine home with parents that
have such love and concern for their children and have tried very hard to
instill a love for God in each of them." Mrs. Black indicated that they are
hopeful that the defendant will receive some help rather than being committed to prison.
RESPONSE TO 90-DAY EVALUATION:
The defendant arrived in the custody of the Division of Corrections shortly
after appearing in Court on April 24, 1980 and being ordered to undergo a
90-Day Diagnostic Evaluation at the Utah State Prison. At his own request,
the defendant was placed in protective custody as he was pending testifying
in court against the co-defendant. As the Court is aware, the defendant
was cooperative at the preliminary hearing stage in reference to giving
evidence against the co-defendant. This agent has met with the defendant
on numerous occasions in protective custody at the Utah State Prison.
Mr. Northern has indicated to this agent that he did not know this
particular offense was going to occur and did not shoot Mr. Hamby. The
defendant maintained that he was basically held prisoner by the co-defendant
until the time of his arrest. Mr. Northern maintained that he was going to
contact the police.
Due to the fact that the defendant has been housed in protective custody,
he has been involved in no negative activity. He remains in his cell
aluiost 22 hours a day. The defendant has made inquiries as to whether he
could work on his GED and seems very anxious to further his education.
Mr. Northern has been cooperative with this agent and counselors at the
institution and appears to be outgoing and congenial. However, much of
the information the defendant supplied this agent contradicts previous
information given the law enforcement agencies.
SUHIARY AMD EVALUATION:
Kendall Quinn Northern is an 18 year old Caucasian male who has pleaded
guilty to two First Degree Felonies. As the Court is aware, numerous
Forgery counts will not be brought against the defendant as part of a
plea arrangement. At the time of his arrest for the present offense
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SUTPARY AND VALUATION:

(Continued)

the defendant was wanted by Juvenile authorities in the state of Arizona
in reference to three separate charges. It appears that early in 19*9
the defendant went on a crime spree which involved various offenses in
several different states. When the defendant cane to Utah he had recentlv
been released from jail in Houston, Texas after taking a family van to
that jurisdiction and getting arrested in reference to a traffic charge.
Utilizing an identification which he had either found or stolen, the defendant established a checking account in Salt Lake City under an assumed nar.e.
He wrote numerous checks including a check for the murder weapon in reference
to the pending charge.
Mr. Northern assumed employment at EIMCO in September of 1979 and advised
his employer that he was going to leave town. Instead, the defendant
assumed employment at a local cab company where the victim in this case was
also employed. The defendant maintains that he was going to contact the
police after the comnission of the present offense but according to
Detective Voyles they were able to arrest the defendant as he was preparing
to leave town.
According to the various psychological and psychiatric material in possession
of the Division of Corrections, it appears that the defendant is basically
untreatable. According to Dr. LeBeque, however, there is some recent information indicating individuals such as the defendant might be treated over a
long term period with sone success. Generally Northern appears to be motivated
towards pursuing his education but he is basically an immature, confused young
man who is certainly a threat to the community.
SENTENCING OPTIONS:
OPTION I

That the defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison in
reference to the charge of Aggravated Robbery and that it be
served on a consecutive basis with the sentence imposed in
reference to the Criminal Homicide charge.

OPTION II That the defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison on a
concurrent basis in reference to both offenses.
OPTION III That the defendant be conmitted to the Utah State Prison and
that he be sentenced to the next lower offense, a Felony II.
OPTION IV That the defendant be ordered to undergo a second 90Oay
Evaluation to determine if he is an appropriate candidate for
the Public Offender Program.

y.
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